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RONALD INGLEHART
University of Michigan and University of Geneva
Economic Scarcity and Political Priorities:
An Analytic Framework
A transformation may be taking place in the
political cultures of advanced industrial soci-
eties. This transformation seems to be altering
the basic value priorities of given generations,
as a result of changing conditions influencing
their basic socialization. The changes seem to
affect the stand one takes on current political
issues and may have a long-term tendency to
alter existing patterns of political partisanship.
In this article, I will present evidence based on
surveys from six countries concerning these
processes.
The findings seem to support a specific inter-
pretation of the causes of value change in post-
industrial societies; let me first outline this in-
terpretation. My basic hypothesis is that given
individuals pursue various goals in hierarchical
order—giving maximum attention to the things
they sense to be the most important unsatisfied
needs at a given time.1 A man lost in a desert,
for example, may be obsessed by his need for
water, devoting virtually all his attention to the
search for it. When a supply of water is readily
available but food is scarce, he may take the
former need for granted (having achieved bio-
logical homeostasis in that respect) and may
devote himself to gathering food. Once his food
supply has reached a subsistence level, an indi-
vidual may continue striving in order to pile up
a comfortable margin of economic security;
later, he may gradually shift his focus, coming
to desire worldly goods as symbols of affluence
—more in order to enhance his status among
less affluent acquaintances than for the utility
of the goods themselves. In a sense, however,
the pursuit of symbols of affluence could be re-
garded as derivative from the search for sus-
tenance.
* The author is indebted to Samuel Barnes, Karl
Deutsch, Kent Jennings, Warren Miller, Robert Put-
nam, and Donald Stokes for comments and criticism
of an earlier draft of this article.
1
 For a more complete presentation of this hypothe-
sis, see Ronald Inglehart, "Revolutionnarisme Post-
Bourgeois en France, en Allemagne et aux fitats-Unis,"
// Politico, 36, 2 (1971) 209-238; and Ronald Inglehart
and Leon Lindberg, "Political Cleavages in Post-Indus-
trial Society: the May Revolt in France" (forthcoming).
Important groups among the populations of
Western societies have passed beyond these
stages, we believe, and today are acting in pur-
suit of goals which (unlike symbols of afflu-
ence) no longer have a direct relationship to
the imperatives of economic security.2 These
individuals—drawn largely from the younger
cohorts of the modern middle class—have been
socialized during an unprecedentedly long pe-
riod of unprecedentedly high affluence. For
them, economic security may be taken for
granted, as the supply of water or the air we
breathe once could.
If this hypothesis is correct, it suggests that
intergenerational political conflict is likely. We
would expect to find such conflict if it is true
that individuals have a tendency to retain a
given value hierarchy throughout adult life,
once a basic character has been formed during
childhood and youth. An illustration would be
the miser who experienced economic hardship
during his childhood, saw hard work and fru-
gality as a way out, and continued accumulat-
ing frantically long after his economic needs
had been assured. This is, no doubt, an ex-
treme case, but considerable evidence suggests
that people do tend to retain early-instilled
preferences. Drawing on the work of Abraham
Maslow,3 we reason that the age cohorts who
had experienced the wars and scarcities of the
era preceding the West European economic
miracles would accord a relatively high priority
to economic security and to what Maslow
terms the safety needs. For the younger co-
horts, a set of "post-bourgeois" values, relating
to the need for belonging and to asthetic and
!An example of induced reversion to biological
priorities, under starvation conditions, is described in
James C. Davies, Human Nature and Politics (New
York: Wiley, 1963), p. 13. A conscientious objector
taking part in an experiment progressively lost his in-
terest in social welfare work after a number of weeks
on a semistarvation diet.
"See Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Person-
ality (New York: Harper, 1954). An excellent discus-
sion of value hierarchies and their political implica-
tions appears in Robert E. Lane, Political Thinking
and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham, 1970), Chap-
ter 2.
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intellectual needs, would be more likely to take
top priorities.4
Probably the best documented evidence of
the persistence of early-instilled political pref-
erences is found in the area of political party
identification.5 But it is precisely in this area
that our hypotheses have another interesting
implication—they suggest the presence of a
long-term pressure acting to reshape previous
relationships between social class and political
party preference. If the shift to a new set of
value priorities results from attainment of a sat-
uration level in regard to needs previously
given top priority, we would expect a new or-
dering of values to manifest itself first and most
fully among those groups that have attained the
highest levels of affluence. In other words, we
would expect to find it appearing first among
the upper middle class, and among working
class or farm groups only after a considerable
delay. But despite the fact that middle-class sta-
tus has generally tended to be associated with a
preference for relatively conservative political
parties, the newly emerging type of value prior-
ities seems likely to be linked with support for
radical social change. Under given conditions,
we believe, this can lead to massive shifts to the
political parties of the Left on the part of youn-
ger middle-class groups. Conversely, working-
class respondents would be relatively likely to
have underlying value preferences which make
them potential recruits for conservative parties
—despite their traditional association with par-
ties of the Left. These individuals have attained
a certain level of prosperity relatively recently,
and apparently continue to place a compara-
tively high value on defending and extending
their recent gains. Paradoxically, although they
have working-class occupations, they may man-
ifest what is sometimes regarded as a "bour-
geois" mentality.
1
 Supporting evidence might be drawn from Richard
Flacks' study of political activists and nonactivists
among University of Chicago students. His findings
indicate that students from relatively affluent homes
tend to place greater emphasis on involvement in in-
tellectual and esthetic pursuits, humanitarian consider-
ations, and opportunities for self-expression, and they
tend to de-emphasize material success, personal
achievement, conventional morality, and religiosity;
moreover, they are much more likely to become acti-
vists than students from less affluent backgrounds. See
Richard Flacks, "The Revolt of the Advantaged: An
Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest," Jour-
nal of Social Issues, 23 (1967).
"See, among others, Angus Campbell, Philip Con-
verse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, The Ameri-
can Voter (New York: Wiley, I960). Cf. Philip Con-
verse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the
Electorate in France and the U.S.," in Angus Camp-
bell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New
York: Wiley, 1966), Chapter 14.
In short, the "middle majority"6 hypothesis
may have been correct, as far as it went: in-
creasing affluence would make the working
class feel they had a stake in the system. By
comparison with the emerging post-bourgeois
group, both the proletariat and bourgeoisie of
industrial society shared certain acquisitive val-
ues; their conflicts were not due to differences
in basic value priorities, but to the fact that one
party had, and was overwhelmingly eager to
keep, what the other party wanted above all. If
this were, indeed, the case, an increasing degree
of property ownership might well "embourgeoi-
sify" the workers, lessening the intensity of class
conflict. Nevertheless, Western societies do not
seem to have reached a new era of consensual
politics: the emergence of "post-bourgeois"
value priorities among a small but critical sec-
tor of these societies may lead to a phase dur-
ing which political cleavages will no longer be
based primarily on the familiar economic con-
flicts—but will, increasingly, be polarized ac-
cording to differences in underlying value pri-
orities.7 This new axis of political cleavage
would, initially, oppose one section of the mid-
dle class to the remainder of society. Assuming
continued prosperity, however, our analysis
suggests that this deviant group would grow in
relative size.
In a recent article,8 the outcome of the
French 1968 uprising and elections was inter-
preted on the basis of the foregoing conceptual
scheme. The May Revolt, we argued, was an
event which had an exceptionally powerful im-
pact on the French electorate, causing many
voters to re-examine their habitual party prefer-
ences in the light of underlying values—and to
realign themselves accordingly. Although the
prevailing rhetoric of the May Revolt cast it as
the movement of an exploited proletariat rising
against bourgeois Gaullist oppression, in the
subsequent elections the French working class
showed a net shift which favored the Gaullists
—while the modern middle class9 (especially
0
 This line of reasoning is presented in Ralf Dahren-
dorf, "Recent Changes in the Class Structure of Euro-
pean Societies"; and in Seymour Lipset, "The Chang-
ing Class Structure and Contemporary European
Politics," both in A New Europe, ed., Stephen Grau-
bard (Boston: Beacon, 1967).
'Joseph Schumpeter reasoned along somewhat simi-
lar lines in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New
York: Harper, 1942).
8
 See Inglehart, op. cit.
•We distinguish between the modem middle class
and the traditional middle class on the basis of occu-
pation: the latter group consists of self-employed small
businessmen and artisans; the former group comprises
people with nonmanual occupations in the modern
sector of the economy, and tends to be characterized
by a higher level of economic security (and a lower
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 993
its younger members) showed a net shift to the
Left, by comparison with the way these groups
had voted in 1967. They apparently did so, in
part, because the younger middle class tended
to place a lower value on economic security
and domestic order than did the workers. The
disorders of 1968—particularly insofar as they
entailed destruction of property—seem to have
had a negative impact on the working class,
driving many of them from their traditionally
Leftist political loyalties toward support of
General De Gaulle—who was widely seen as
the guarantor of order.
Thanks to an ongoing program of public
opinion research sponsored by the European
Community, it was possible to take a set of pre-
dictions based on this interpretation of the
1968 French data and subject them to a more
exhaustive cross-national test. Working in col-
laboration with the European Community In-
formation Service, I took part in the design of
a six-nation survey of political change in West-
ern Europe, which went into the field in 1970.10
Items included in these surveys were de-
signed to tap politically relevant aspects of an
individual's basic value hierarchy. We wanted
to know which values a respondent would rank
highest when he was forced to choose on the
one hand between such things as economic se-
curity and domestic order (which we regarded as
indicating instrumental or "acquisitive" val-
ues), and on the other items relating to expres-
sive, or "post-bourgeois" value priorities. Our
expectation was that those who had been so-
cialized under conditions of relatively high and
stable affluence should show a relative prefer-
ence for such values as free speech and politi-
cal participation. In the current social context,
it was hypothesized, these values should be
linked with a relatively change-oriented stand
on current political issues. And if, as hypothe-
sized, we are dealing with a basic, rather than a
peripheral, aspect of the individual's socializa-
tion, we should find indications that these pref-
erences influence a broad range of his political
opinions.
We might expect the emergence of value
preferences which do not conform to those of
society as a whole to be linked with a prefer-
likelihood of being attracted to extreme-Right political
movements). Our use of this distinction was suggested
by Seymour Martin Lipset's analysis in Political Man:
The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City: Doubleday,
I960), especially Chapter 5.10
 We are indebted to Jacques-Ren6 Rabier, director-
general of the European Community Information Ser-
vice, for the role he has played in encouraging cross-
national collaborative research with Michigan (and a
number of other universities) over the past several
years.
ence for change-oriented political parties—in
terms of traditional concepts, the parties of the
Left. This tendency would be resisted, however,
by another aspect of the presumed persistence
of early political learning—the tendency to-
ward persistence of early-instilled political
party identification. To the extent that given in-
dividuals have acquired a sense of identification
with the (traditionally middle-class) parties of
the Right and Center, they would be slow to
shift their support to a party of the Left, even
assuming the presence of favorable underlying
value preferences. The converse should also
hold true; respondents who were raised in a
Left-oriented political tradition would normally
be somewhat inhibited from shifting to parties
of the Right, even assuming the presence of rel-
atively conservative value preferences.
An Empirically-based Typology of Value Pri-
orities and Its Expected Relationship to
Economic History
These hypotheses concern changes in value
priorities over long periods of time. Very little
relevant time-series data is available, and conse-
quently one cannot test this interpretation di-
rectly. To do so conclusively would require a
large-scale research program continuing over
several decades. In the meantime, however, one
can subject these hypotheses to a variety of indi-
rect tests. While these tests cannot provide a
definitive validation or falsification, they may
aid the reader in forming a judgment concern-
ing the relative plausibility of this interpreta-
tion, in the light of the total configuration of
evidence.
The first type of indirect evidence is drawn
from cross-sectional age-cohort analysis. This
approach involves substantial methodological
problems. Can one, in fact, draw conclusions
about change over time from cross-sectional
data? Under some conditions the answer, rather
clearly, is yes: it depends on how much confi-
dence one has that the cross-sectional data
measure relatively stable characteristics of a
given age cohort.11 To take an obvious exam-
ple, you can project how many 21-year-olds
there will be in the U.S. ten years from now
11
 For a sophisticated discussion and application of
this type of analysis, see David Butler and Donald
Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping
Electoral Choice (New York: St. Martin's 1969),
especially Chapters 3, 11 and 12. Butler and Stokes
find that political party affiliation is a rather stable
characteristic of British cohorts. In the relatively large
swing from Conservative to Labour which took place
from 1959 to 1963, they conclude, replacement of the
electorate (linked with differential birth and mortality
rates) actually played a larger role than did conver-
sion of voters from one party to the other.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
10
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
5:
01
:1
8,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
23
07
/1
95
34
94
994 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
Table 1. Educational Level, by Age Cohort
(Percentage educated beyond primary school)
Age range of
cohort in
1970
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Neth.
87%
66
58
44
40
25
Belg.
87
69
67
50
35
17
Italy
84
60
43
35
29
28
France
77
62
50
39
33
30
Germany
48
39
29
33
28
23
Britain
47
37
26
24
19
13
and twenty years from now, if you have data
on the size of the various age-groups today.
Your prediction might be upset by a major war
or other catastrophe, but otherwise it is likely
to be fairly accurate. To take another example,
let us look at the differences in educational lev-
els among the respective age cohorts in our six
national samples. (See Table 1.) The differ-
ences are quite sizeable, reflecting the massive
expansion of secondary and higher education in
Western Europe during the past two genera-
tions. These figures, I would argue, reflect a rel-
atively enduring characteristic of the respective
age cohorts: except among the youngest group,
the level is unlikely to rise much; nor is it likely
to decline for any of the cohorts. The presence
of a high level of formal education may well
have important effects on the political behavior
of a given group. To the extent that such rela-
tionships can be demonstrated, longitudinal
projections derived from the age-cohort differ-
ences are likely to be reasonably reliable.
With these remarks in mind, let us examine
the pattern of responses to a series of items
which were designed to measure an individual's
hierarchy of politically relevant values. Repre-
sentative national samples of the population
over 15 years of age in Great Britain, Ger-
many, Belgium, The Netherlands, France and
Italy were asked the question:12
" Fieldwork was carried out in February and March,
1970, by Louis Harris Research, Ltd. (London), In-
stitut fur Demoskopie {Allensbach), International Re-
search Associates (Brussels), Netherlands Institut voor
de Publieke Opinie (Amsterdam), Institut francais
d'opinion publique (Paris), and Institut per le Ri-
cerche Statische e 1'Analisi del'opinione Pubblica (Mi-
lan). The respective samples had N's of: 1975 (Brit-
ain), 2021 (Germany), 1298 (Belgium), 1230 (Nether-
lands), 2046 (France), and 1822 (Italy).
The survey also included Luxembourg, but the num-
ber of respondents from that country (335) was con-
sidered too small for use in the present analysis. The
Dutch sample has been weighed to correct for sam-
pling deficiencies, and the weighted N appears in the
following tables; while the data from The Netherlands
are, in the author's opinion, less reliable than those
"If you had to choose among the following
things, which are the two that seem most desir-
able to you?
Maintaining order in the nation.
Giving the people more say in important po-
litical decisions.
Fighting rising prices.
Protecting freedom of speech."
Two choices only were permitted; thus
(aside from nonresponse and partial nonre-
sponse) it was possible for a respondent to se-
lect any of six possible pairs of items. In rela-
tion to my hypotheses, two of the items (the
first and third) were regarded as indicating tra-
ditional "acquisitive" value preferences: a con-
cern with domestic order is presumed to relate,
above all, to the protection of property;13 and
from the other countries, the crucial intra-sample dif-
ferences discussed in this article are sufficiently large
as to minimize the likelihood that they simply reflect
sampling error. On the other hand, cross-national com-
parisons based on the Dutch marginals should be
viewed with reservations. The surveys in the European
Community countries were sponsored by the European
Community Information Service; research in Great
Britain was supported by funds from the University
of Michigan.
"From the viewpoint of most of our respondents,
that is: in extreme situations, threats to domestic order
can, of course, involve danger to one's life. To the
extent that a concern with one's personal safety is
involved, the item taps the need which Maslow places
immediately below the economic needs in his hierarchy.
Post-bourgeois responses, then, are seen as reflecting
security in respect to both the economic and safety
needs. There is reason to expect that the intergener-
ational pattern of priorities would be similar for the
two types of needs: older cohorts are more likely to
have experienced threats to their physical security, as
well as to their economic security, during formative
years. The persisting effect of the former experience
is suggested by the fact that older Germans are more
likely to express a fear of World War than are the
post-war cohorts: see Peter Merkl, "Politico-Cultural
Restraints on West-German Foreign Policy," Com-
parative Political Studies, 3 (January, 1971). We
doubt that many of our respondents felt physically
threatened in 1970, however; for most, this item prob-
ably evokes nothing more than thoughts of property
damage.
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 995
Table 2. "Pure" Value Pairs, by Nation
(Percentage choosing each pair within given national sample)
Pair chosen:
Acquisitive
Post-bourgeois
Nether.
30%
17
Belgium
32
14
Italy
35
13
France
38
11
Germany
43
10
Britain
36
8
the relevance of rising prices to acquisitive mo-
tivations is fairly self-evident. The other two
items in this set were regarded as indicating a
preference for "post-bourgeois" values. I use
the latter term with an awareness that political
liberties were among the things traditionally
valued by the bourgeoisie—but with the con-
viction that this group was characterized even
more distinctively by a predominant concern
for acquiring and retaining economic goods. It
is not a question of valuing one thing posi-
tively and the other negatively: other items in
our data indicate that most people place a posi-
tive value on all four of the above goals. But in
politics it is sometimes impossible to maximize
one good without detriment to another. In such
cases, the relative priority among valued objec-
tives becomes a vital consideration. Our ques-
tions, therefore, were cast in the form of
forced-choice items in an attempt to measure
these priorities. Empirically, it appears that al-
though nearly everyone strongly favors free-
dom of speech (for example), there are strik-
ing differences in the priority given to it by var-
ious social groups.
The choice of one "post-bourgeois" item
showed a relatively strong positive correlation
with the choice of the other "post-bourgeois"
item, in each national sample; the same was
true of the two "acquisitive" items. Thus, ap-
proximately half of the respondents in each
sample chose one of the two "pure" pairs of
value preferences, with the other half spread
over the four remaining "mixed" (or ambiva-
lent) pairs, plus nonresponse. (See Table 2.)
Note that the pure "acquisitive" pair predomi-
nates across the six samples by a ratio of at
least 3 :1 .
On the basis of the choices made among
these four items, it is possible to classify our
We follow the Marxist tradition in according an
important role to economic determination—although
only within certain thresholds. Both before industrial-
ization and after an industrial society reaches a
threshold of general economic security, we believe that
other values are likely to prevail more widely. The
concept of discretionary income is analogous to our
interpretation of the second threshold: as an economy
rises well above the subsistence level, even specifically
economic behavior can be explained by economic vari-
ables to a progressively diminishing extent.
respondents into value-priority groups, ranging
from a "pure" acquisitive type to a "pure" post-
bourgeois type, with several intermediate cate-
gories. Use of this typology provides a simple,
straightforward and intuitively meaningful basis
for analysis. I should emphasize, however, that
the use of these categories does not rest exclu-
sively on an individual's choices among the four
goals listed above. On the contrary, these four
were selected as the basis of our typology because
they seem to constitute a particularly sensitive
indicator of a broad range of other political
preferences—some of which have a fairly obvi-
ous relationship to the four basic items, and
some of which appear to be quite distinct, in
terms of face content. For example, on the basis
of the value pair chosen by a given individual,
one can make a fairly accurate prediction of his
response to the following item:
"Within the last couple of years, there have
been large-scale student demonstrations in (Brit-
ain) and other countries. In general, how do
you view these? Are you:
—very favorable
—rather favorable
—rather unfavorable
—very unfavorable"
Table 3 shows the respective levels of sup-
port for student demonstrations in each of the
six countries. While the majority is unfavorable
in each country, there is a wide variation in
support levels according to the pair of value
choices made: a mean difference of fully fifty-
five percentage points separates the "acqui-
sitive" and "post-bourgeois" types of respon-
dents. In every country, respondents choos-
ing the pure "post-bourgeois" pair are the
group most favorable to student demonstra-
tions, giving a heavy majority in support. Over-
all, they are more than four times as likely to
favor the demonstrations as are the "acquisi-
tive" respondents. With only one exception
among the 36 value pairs shown, respondents
choosing the pure "acquisitive" value pair are
least favorable to the student demonstrations
(in the one exceptional case, the "acquisitive"
respondents are within three percentage points
of the least favorable group).
Factor analyses of the respective national
samples consistently showed these value choices
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Table 3. Attitude Toward Student Demonstrations, by Value Pairs Chosen
(Percentage favorable to student, demonstrations)
Nation
Neth.
Italy
Belg.
Germ.
France
Brit.
mean:
Order
&
Prices*
21%
19
18
14
12
12
16%
Order &
Free
Speech
33
29
29
35
18
22
28
Order &
Partici-
pation
42
36
36
29
23
9
29
Prices &
Free
Speech
37
42
32
35
38
22
35
Prices &
Partici-
pation
47
54
60
46
41
60
51
Free Speech
& Partici-
pation*
70
77
65
83
66
65
71
Overall
39%
36
35
32
27
17
* Indicates the two "pure" value pairs, on the basis of our hypothesis—representing, respectively, "acquisitive"
and "post-bourgeois" values.
to be among the high-loading items (in a set of
25 variables) on what I interpret as an "acquis-
itive/post-bourgeois values" factor.14 In every
case, the choice of "order" and "prices" had
relatively high negative loadings on this factor,
while the choice of "free speech'" and '"partici-
pation" had relatively high positive loadings.
In view of the face content of the items, it is
not particularly surprising that we find a strong
relationship between these value choices and
the respondents' support of or opposition to
student demonstrations. But these same value
choices also show significant relationships with
other political preferences which have no obvi-
ous similarity in terms of face content. For ex-
ample, they serve as good predictors of atti-
tudes toward supranational European integra-
tion. Table 4 shows the relationship between
value choices and responses to a three-item in-
dex of support for European integration.15
"Other high-loading items on this factor related
to: expectations of a higher standard of living, sup-
port for student demonstrations, support for radical
social change, and support for a variety of proposals
for European integration (all of which had positive
polarity); and emphasis on job security, pride in one's
own nationality, and support for a strong national
army (which had negative polarity). Because of limited
funds, the British questionnaire was shorter than the
one used in the European Community countries, and
the factor analysis for that sample omits some of the
items available in the larger data sets. Apart from
these omissions, the British response pattern seems to
parallel that found on the Continent. The fact that ex-
pectations of a higher future standard of living seem
to go with giving a relatively low priority to economic
security is interesting: it tends to confirm our inter-
pretation that, for the post-bourgeois group, economic
values are relatively unimportant because they are
taken for granted.
uThis index was based on responses to the follow-
ing items: "Supposing the people of Britain and the
Common Market were asked to decide on the follow-
ing questions. How would you vote . . .?
Once again, we find the two theoretically
"pure" sets of value priorities occupying the
opposite poles of the continuum—with post-
bourgeois respondents markedly more Euro-
pean in outlook than the acquisitive-type re-
spondents. There are only two mild exceptions
to the rule that the respondents choosing the
theoretically "ambivalent" value pairs are more
European than the theoretically pure acquisi-
tives types, and less European than the post-
bourgeois types. The ordering within the "am-
bivalent" pairs changes somewhat from the pat-
tern we found in Table 3, with a concern for
rising prices now showing a stronger associa-
tion with the negative end of the scale than the
preoccupation with domestic order which for-
merly held that place; in other respects, the
ranking of value pairs remains the same. Over-
all, the post-bourgeois respondents are more
than twice as likely to be classified as "clearly
—Would you be in favor of, or against, the elec-
tion of a European parliament by direct universal
suffrage; that is, a parliament elected by all the
voters in the member countries?
—Would you be willing to accept, over and above
the (British) government, a European government
responsible for a common policy in foreign affairs,
defense and the economy?
—If a President of a United States of Europe
were being elected by popular vote, would you be
willing to vote for a candidate not of your own
country, if his personality and programme corre-
sponded more closely to your ideas than those of
the candidates from your own country?"
A respondent was categorized as "clearly for" Euro-
pean integration if he gave favorable responses to all
three of these items; or to at least two of them pro-
vided that his response to the third item was "don't
know," rather than "against." For a much more de-
tailed exploration of this topic, see my article "Chang-
ing Value Priorities and European Integration," Journal
of Common Market Studies, September, 1971.
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 997
Table 4. Support for European Integration, by Value Pairs Chosen
(Percentage scored as "Clearly For" on European Integration Index)
Nation
Italy
Germany
France
Belgium
Netherlands
Britain
mean:
Prices
&
Order*
48%
45
36
31
28
13
30%
Prices &
Free
Speech
53
57
38
39
31
16
36
Prices &
Partici-
pation
63
64
48
43
34
16
41
Order &
Free
Speech
65
67
48
46
43
36
47
Order &
Partici-
pation
73
59
61
50
52
20
49
Free Speech
& Partici-
pation*
69
76
69
64
62
32
61
Overall
57%
55
44
42
39
17
• Indicates the two "pure" value pairs.
for" supranational European integration as are
the acquisitive respondents.16
As we shall see presently, these value choices
also show a rather striking set of relationships
with social structure and political party prefer-
ences. This is scarcely the sort of pattern which
would emerge from random answering or from
a superficial response to transient stimuli. It ap-
pears that these items tap a relatively well inte-
grated and deep-rooted aspect of the respon-
dents' political orientations.
If these items do tap attitudes that are early
established and relatively persistent, responses
to them should show distinctive patterns, re-
flecting distinctive conditions which prevailed
during the formative years of the respective age
cohorts. Our next step, therefore, is to examine
variations in response according to age group.
Before doing so, let us attempt to specify, as
precisely as possible, what sort of pattern we
would expect to find on the basis of our ana-
lytic framework.
In the first place, the most recently formed
cohorts should show the highest proportion of
post-bourgeois responses and the lowest pro-
portion of acquisitive responses, in every na-
tional sample. The respondents born after 1945
constitute the only group which (as far back as
their memory reaches) has been socialized en-
tirely under conditions of rising affluence, unin-
terrupted by major economic dislocations. As
a first approximation, therefore, we would pre-
dict that: (1) the distribution of attitudes
should resemble an L-shaped curve, with a very
low proportion of post-bourgeois attitudes be-
ing found among respondents born before
1945, and a sharp rise in the prevalence of
post-bourgeois values among those born after
that date; conversely, the occurrence of acquisi-
tive values should be uniformly high among all
10
 There is a certain similarity between the configura-
tion of "post-bourgeois" preferences and the well-
known concept of "authoritarianism." Both concepts
relate to the priorities one gives to liberty, as opposed
to order. And—as we have just seen—the libertarian
position seems linked with internationalism. This fol-
lows from the fact that, according to our analysis, the
post-bourgeois groups have attained security in regard
to both the safety and sustenance needs; insofar as
the nation-state is seen as a bulwark protecting the
individual against foreign threats, it is less important to
post-bourgeois respondents. They have, moreover, a
larger amount of "venture capital," psychically speak-
ing, available to invest in projects having an intel-
lectual and esthetic appeal—such as European unifica-
tion. There are both theoretical and empirical differ-
ences between our position and that prevailing in the
authoritarianism literature. We emphasize a process of
historically-shaped causation which is not necessarily
incompatible with, but certainly takes a different focus
from, the psychodynamics of authoritarianism. Em-
pirically, authoritarianism, like acquisitive value pri-
orities, tends to be linked with lower economic status.
By contrast, there are indications that children and
youth tend to be more authoritarian than adults.
(Stouffer, however, reported evidence of sizeable age-
group differences among adult groups in degree of
"Tolerance for Non-Conformity," with young adults
far more tolerant than older adults; he sees the evi-
dence as reflecting both life-cycle and intergenerational
effects. See Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity
and Civil Liberties [New York: Doubleday, 1955],
p. 89). In any event, neither previous explorations nor
the present surveys revealed reasonably strong or con-
sistent relationships between standardized F-scale items
and the attitudes reported here. The two concepts seem
related, but items which served as indicators of au-
thoritarianism in earlier research appear to have
limited applicability in the Europe of the 1970's. For
a report of an earlier cross-national exploration of
authoritarianism and internationalism, see Ronald
Inglehart, "The New Europeans: Inward or Outward
Looking?" International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 1
(Winter, 1970), pp. 129-139. The literature on au-
thoritarianism is immense; the classic work is Theodor
W. Adomo, et a/., The Authoritarian Personality (New
York: Harper, 1950); Cf. Richard Christie and Marie
Jahoda, eds., Studies in the Scope and Method of
"The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe: Free Press,
1954).
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Figure 1. The decline in Britain's relative economic position. The U.S. and major European countries
ranked according to per capita Gross National Product, 1900 to 1970. (Source: The Economist," Sep-
tember 5, 1970, p. 69.)
cohorts bom before 1945, with a precipitate
drop as we reach the postwar cohorts. This pat-
tern can only serve as a first approximation of
course. It would be ridiculous to argue that no
change in basic values can occur during adult
life; our point is simply that the probability of
such change becomes much lower after one
reaches adulthood, and probably continues to
decline thereafter. To the extent that adult re-
learning takes place, it would tend to smooth
out the basic L-shaped curve. The fact that
value preferences probably crystallize in differ-
ent individuals at somewhat different ages,
would also tend to have this effect.
We would not expect to find a zero incidence
of post-bourgeois values even among the oldest
cohorts: there has always been at least a small
stratum of economically secure individuals,
able to give top priority to nonacquisitive val-
ues. But this stratum should be smallest among
the oldest cohorts if, indeed, it tends to reflect
the level of affluence prevailing within a given
society during a given cohort's pre-adult years.
By the same token the distribution of these
value preferences should vary cross-nationally
in a predictable fashion—reflecting the eco-
nomic history of the given nation. Fortunately
for our analysis, there are substantial differ-
ences in the 20th-century economic experiences
of the nations in our sample. These variations
enable us to make predictions about the rela-
tive level and steepness of the value-distribution
curves for given nations. To put it briefly, high
absolute levels of wealth in a given nation at a
given time would predict relatively high pro-
portions of post-bourgeois respondents among
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 999
the cohorts socialized under those conditions;
high rates of growth for a given country would
predict relatively large increases in the propor-
tion of post-bourgeois respondents, across that
nation's age-groups. The economic progress of
Great Britain, in particular, shows a sharp con-
trast with that of the other five nations.
Throughout the first four decades of the 20th
century, Britain—the home of the first Indus-
trial Revolution—was by far the wealthiest
country in Europe, and in world wide compari-
sons it ranked second only to the U.S. (and,
sometimes, Canada) in per capita income. Dur-
ing the decade before World War II, among the
nations in our sample, The Netherlands ranked
closest to Britain (with a per capita income 71
per cent as high as the British) followed by
France, Belgium and Germany, with Italy far
behind (having only 27 per cent the per capita
income of Britain). In the postwar era, the eco-
nomically privileged position which Britain had
long enjoyed began to deteriorate rapidly (see
Figure 1). Although her absolute level of income
rose gradually (interrupted by periods of stag-
nation), Britain was overtaken by one after an-
other of her European neighbors—nearly all of
which experienced much more rapid and con-
tinuous economic growth; these growth rates
were particularly steep in the case of Germany
and Italy (see Figure 2). By 1970, Britain had
been outstripped by five of the six European
Community countries, with the sixth (Italy)
not far behind.
On the basis of these historical data, we can
make four predictions about the expected
value-distribution curves in addition to the re-
shaped curve posited earlier in our first predic-
tion. (2) Among those respondents who
reached adulthood before World War II, the
size of the stratum which had known economic
security during its formative years would be
small—but its relative size should be greater in
the British sample than in the other national
samples. Translated into expected survey re-
sults, this means that the British cohorts now in
their mid-50's or older should show the highest
frequency of post-bourgeois values. (3) The
rate of value change found in Britain, however,
should be much lower than that in the other
five countries. Her economic growth rate since
World War II has been approximately half that
of the average among the European Community
countries; as a first approximation, we might
expect the rate of increase in post-bourgeois
values found among Britain's younger cohorts
to be half as great as that within the EEC. (4)
In prevalence of post-bourgeois values among
the younger cohorts, we might expect Britain to
be outstripped by all of the European Commu-
320
300
280
2S0
240
220
200
ISO
160
140
120
100
Italy
United
Kingdom
1953 IS58 1963 1968
Figure 2. Economic growth, 1953-68. Based on
indices of industrial production (1953 = 1.00).
Source: "U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1969."
The year 1953 is taken as our base line to avoid giving
undue prominence to recovery from the devastation ol
World War II: using 1948 or 1945 as a base would
tend to exaggerate the disparity between Germany and
Italy (on one hand) and Great Britain (on the other
hand).
nity countries except Italy. (5) Among these
six nations, Germany and Italy—the two coun-
tries experiencing the most rapid economic
change during the post-war era—should show
the greatest amount of intergenerational change
in basic value priorities.17
With these five predictions in mind, let us ex-
amine the empirical relationship between value
preferences and age cohort, within each na-
tional sample. (See Table 5.) Our basic predic-
tion—that the younger cohorts will be less
likely to show acquisitive value priorities and
more likely to show post-bourgeois values—is
confirmed strikingly. Among the oldest cohort,
the disproportionate preference for the pure
11
 It is difficult to interpret the cross-national pattern
as a reaction to current events within the respective
nations. There is considerable evidence of a recent
law-and-order reaction in the face of student disorders
in each of these countries. But if the cross-national
differences were largely the result of such a reaction,
we would expect to find the emphasis on order to be
greatest in France (where the recent upheaval was
greatest) and weakest in Britain (which has had the
smallest amount of domestic disorder). The data mani-
festly fail to fit this pattern; we must explain them in
terms of predispositions anterior to, rather than result-
ing from, the recent domestic disorders these countries
have experienced.
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Table 5. "Pure" Value Preferences, by Age Cohort
(Percentage choosing each pair)*
Age Range
1970
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 +
DifTcrence between
cohorts:
Netherlands
Act).
20%
27
36
29
37
44
- 2 4
P-B N
29 (442)
16(408)
14(406)
15 (285)
7 (223)
5 (138)
48
+24
Acq
19
35
28
29
37
45
- 2 6
Belgium
. P-B N
26 (227)
13(211)
19 (234)
13(188)
8 (201)
2 (235)
50
+24
Acq.
18
30
36
37
42
54
- 3 6
Italy
P-BN
28 (335)
15 (256)
11(397)
8 (310)
7(315)
4 (193)
60
+24
Acq.
21
35
36
39
48
50
-29
France
P-BN
20 (365)
11(369)
14 (347)
10 (319)
6 (280)
2(366)
47
+ 18
Acq
21
35
46
47
60
56
-35
Germany
. P-BN
23 (317)
15 (409)
8 (372)
7(326)
4 (325)
2(265)
56
+21
Acq.
25
29
29
37
41
50
- 2 5
Britain
P-BN
14 (254)
9 (340)
S (278)
5 (398)
8(331)
5 (374)
34
+ 9
* Number in parentheses is base on which percentages are calculated.
"acquisitive" pair is overwhelming: half or
nearly half of the entire cohort choose that one
pair, out of six possibilities. Most of the re-
maining respondents in this cohort are ambiva-
lent; a relative handful—in no case more than
five per cent—chooses the post-bourgeois set of
priorities. Overall, acquisitive types outnumber
post-bourgeois types by a ratio of better than
15:1 in this cohort. As we move up the table
from the oldest to the youngest cohort, the pro-
portion choosing the pure "acquisitive" pair
falls off markedly, diminishing by considerably
more than one-half in every sample except the
British; even in the latter case, the decline is
just equal to 50 per cent. As we move from
oldest to youngest, the increase in the propor-
tion choosing the post-bourgeois priorities is
proportionately even greater: even in the Brit-
ish sample, where the indications of change
over time are weakest, the post-bourgeois pro-
portion nearly triples.
Moreover, we do find something resembling
a modified L-shaped curve in the distribution of
these responses: across the six national sam-
ples, by far the biggest discontinuity occurs as
we move from the second-youngest to the
youngest cohort Even among the 25-34 year-
old cohort, there is still a heavy plurality of ac-
quisitive types over post-bourgeois types. A ma-
jor shift occurs as we move to the one age
cohort that has been socialized entirely in the
postwar era:18 the post-bourgeois group almost
doubles in size (among the Continental sam-
ples), while the acquisitive group declines
sharply. Within the youngest cohort, the post-
bourgeois group has either reached approxi-
mate parity or moved ahead of the acquisitive
group—except in Britain. Although value
change occurs across the whole range of age
" Interestingly, this shift corresponds to the transition
from the purportedly apolitical youth of the 1950's—
the "Skeptical Generation" or "Uncommitted Youth,"
as they were called—to the relatively radical youth of
the 1960's.
cohorts, no transition is as sharp as the one as-
sociated with socialization in the postwar era.
Moving to cross-national comparisons, we
note that our second prediction is also con-
firmed: Although the British sample as a whole
has the smallest proportion of post-bourgeois
types, among the cohorts who reached adult-
hood before World War II (those now more
than 54 years of age), Britain shows the high-
est proportion of post-bourgeois respondents.
She is very closely followed by the Dutch in
this respect (the nationality which came closest
to the British level of affluence in the prewar
period).
Our third prediction also seems to be con-
firmed by the data: the rate of change across
the British cohorts is much smaller than that
found in any other country. The total number
of points separating the oldest British cohort
from the youngest is not much more than half
as large as the range found in the German and
Italian samples—where apparent intergenera-
tional change is strongest (in keeping with our
fifth prediction).
Our fourth prediction was that among the
youngest cohorts, Britain should rank behind
every country except Italy in her proportion of
post-bourgeois respondents. This expectation is
amply borne out: the British sample ranks far
behind all the other samples—including the
Italian, which seems to be a good deal more
post-bourgeois than it should be on the basis of
economic expectations. We will not attempt to
provide an ad hoc explanation for this anom-
aly: It is puzzling, but on the whole the empiri-
cal findings seem to correspond to expectations
drawn from economic history remarkably well.
Generational or Life-Cycle Interpretation?
At this point we should consider the possibil-
ity that the observed age-group differences re-
flect life-cycle factors, rather than intergenera-
tional change. The large shift in value prefer-
ences which we find as we move from the sec-
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 1001
ond youngest to the youngest cohort is, indeed,
what we would expect to find, on the basis of
the conditions which governed the formative
years of the respective cohorts. But the phenom-
enon might also be interpreted in life-cycle
terms: the cutting point between the two age
groups corresponds roughly to the age at which
the average individual marries and starts a fam-
ily. It could be argued, therefore, that the
youngest cohort shows a tendency toward post-
bourgeois values merely because these individu-
als are young and lack family responsibilities;
when they get older, they will have the same
value priorities as the older cohorts have now.
Since responses to these items seem to be rela-
tively well integrated into the individual's atti-
tudinal structure—a fact which suggests attitu-
dinal stability—such an interpretation seems
rather unlikely. The finding that the age-cohort
differences seem to reflect the economic history
of the given nation makes the life-cycle inter-
pretation still less satisfactory. And when we
examine the data from still another perspective,
any simple life-cycle interpretation becomes
quite implausible.
As we recall, my basic hypotheses predicted
two sorts of effects associated with an ongoing
transformation of value priorities. The first,
which we have just examined, relates to age-co-
hort differences; the second relates to differing
degrees of affluence. The hypotheses suggest
that the degree of economic security an individ-
ual felt during his formative years may play a
key role in shaping his later political behavior.
For most of our sample, it is impossible (at this
late date) to obtain a direct measure of this
variable. We do have some indirect indicators,
however. Perhaps the most accurate one is the
respondents' level of formal education: in
Western Europe (even more than in the U.S.)
one's likelihood of obtaining a secondary or
university education is very closely related to
the socioeconomic status of one's family of ori-
gin. Insofar as it influences levels of education
and career aspirations, the relative affluence of
one's parents also tends to be correlated with
the individual's own economic status. To the
extent that this association holds, our data on
the individual's own education, current occupa-
tion, and income should also serve as a rough
indicator of the degree to which he was eco-
nomically secure during his formative years.
(Most of the women in our sample do not have
independent occupations: for them, our indica-
tors are their own education and the occupa-
tion of head of family.)
In terms of the indicators available to us,
then, our prediction is that post-bourgeois val-
ues should be most prevalent among those who
currently enjoy a relatively high socioeconomic
status—although this indicator is understood to
be important chiefly insofar as it reflects afflu-
ence during one's formative years. Let us test
this hypothesis. Table 6 shows the distribution
of value preferences according to socioeco-
nomic status (ranked on the basis of a scale
combining occupation and education). Table 6
summarizes the relationship between value pri-
orities and socioeconomic status within the six
national samples. As predicted, the lower socio-
economic groups are much more likely to select
acquisitive value priorities than are the up-
per socioeconomic groups: overall, about 42
per cent of the lower socioeconomic category
chooses the theoretically "pure" acquisitive value
pair—more than double the proportion which
makes that choice among the two highest
socioeconomic categories. Conversely, the up-
per socioeconomic categories are much more
likely to choose the post-bourgeois set of value
priorities. Once again, Britain tends to be a de-
viant case: her social class differences (like her
age-cohort differences) are smaller than those
in the other countries.
On the whole, the relationship between age
cohort and value priorities persists when we
control for socioeconomic status (see Table 7).
Despite the presence of some anomalies (espe-
cially in the Dutch sample), the predominant
pattern is that the percentage choosing acquisi-
Table 6. Value Preferences by Socioeconomic Status
(Percentage choosing respective "pure" value pairs)
Socioeconomic
Status*
Lower S.E.S.
Middle S.E.S.
Upper Middle S.ES.
Upper S.E.S.
Netherlands
Acq.
40%
29
16
11
P-B N
7(551)
20 (526)
30 (365)
52 (66)
Belgium
Acq.
38
33
24
17
P-B N
6(486)
15 (353)
20 (86)
35 (95)
Acq.
38
30
18
18
Italy
P-B N
10 (995)
14 (331)
32 (105)
27 (135)
France
Acq.
47
35
29
14
P-B N
4 (908)
11(626)
15 (369)
42 (143)
Germany
Acq.
49
38
23
16
P-B N
7(1319)
11 (510)
26 (139)
44 (44)
Acq
37
40
28
25
Britain
. P-B N
6(1179)
8 (459)
10 (261)
15 (73)
• "Upper" S.E.S. Group includes respondents from "Modem Middle" class backgrounds having university educations (see footnote 9 for
our definition of the "Modern Middle Class"); "Upper Middle" S.E.S. includes members of that class, having a secondary level of educa-
tion; "Middle" S.E.S. includes respondents from other occupational backgrounds (including traditional middle class) educated beyond
the primary level.
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tive priorities declines sharply, and the percent-
age choosing post-bourgeois priorities rises
sharply, as we move from oldest to youngest
cohorts. Perhaps the most significant aspect of
Table 7 is the extent to which it tends to refute
a life-cycle interpretation of the observed age-
group differences; to uphold such an interpreta-
tion, we would have to posit the existence of
totally different Life cycles for working-class
and middle-class respondents. To be sure,
working-class youth tend to enter the work
force and marry earlier than their middle-class
peers—but in terms of value priorities, the two
classes are out of phase not just by four or five
years, but by nearly a generation. Within the
youngest Dutch cohort, for example, the upper
socioeconomic categories choose post-bourgeois
priorities over acquisitive priorities by a ratio
of 50:6, while 43 per cent of their lower socio-
economic peers choose acquisitive values—with
none making post-bourgeois choices. In the
Belgian sample, the corresponding ratios are
35:12 within the upper middle and upper so-
cioeconomic categories, as contrasted with 14:
24 within the lower socioeconomic category.
On the basis of value priorities, a working-class
Frenchman 20 years old corresponds to a mid-
dle-class Frenchman in his 50's. More or less
the same thing can be said in regard to the
other samples from the countries of the Euro-
pean Community.
The age-cohort variations shown in Table 7,
then, can scarcely be explained as a result of
the aging process alone. An explanation in
terms of economic and physical security during
a formative period accounts for the observed
pattern of both age cohort and socioeconomic
status differences in a parsimonious fashion.
For this interpretation to be applicable, how-
ever, we must accept the hypothesis that these
value priorities reflect an aspect of the individu-
al's orientation which tends to persist over time.
Substantial age-cohort differences also persist
when we apply finer controls for education by
itself (see Table 8). Thus, although formal ed-
ucation seems to have a strong influence on the
value priorities held by an individual, the age-
cohort differences, are not simply due to the
different levels of education characterizing
given age cohorts (as shown in Table 1). Mul-
Table 7. Value Preferences by Age Cohort, Controlling for Socioeconomic Status
(Percentage choosing respective "pure" value pairs)
of cohort
in 1970
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
of cohort
in 1970
16-24
25-34
35-54
45-54
55-64
65+
Britain
"Acquisitive" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=1179)
26%
24
25
38
44
50
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=459)
31
35
43
43
40
54
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=334)
19
34
29
25
33
(34)*
Germany
"Acquisitive" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=1319)
25%
40
48
52
64
59
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=510)
20
29
48
41
54
49
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=183)
10
19
23
33
(32)*
(33)
"Post-Bourgeois" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=1179)
10%
10
7
4
6
5
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=459)
19
7
7
8
8
3
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=334)
16
8
10
4
14
(14)
"Post-Bourgeois" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=1319)
15%
10
6
6
3
2
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=510)
19
17
8
7
6
0
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=183)
49
35
20
14
(16)
(11)
* Percentages based on fewer than 30 cases are enclosed in parentheses.
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Table 7.—{Continued)
of cohort
in 1970
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
of cohort
in 1970
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
of cohort
in 1970
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
of cohort
in 1970
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
France
"Acquisitive" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=908)
30%
41
45
49
53
49
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=626)
20
41
36
26
40
56
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=512)
17
26
24
32
36
31
Italy
"Acquisitive" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=995)
23%
31
36
38
46
53
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=331)
17
26
30
39
44
(46)
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=240)
9
13
25
24
(12)*
(83)
Belgium
"Acquisitive" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=486)
24%
35
32
37
42
41
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=353)
24
38
33
23
34
58
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=181)
12
30
20
20
26
(50)*
Netherlands
"Acquisitive" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N = 551)
43%
36
43
36
46
40
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=526)
23
29
32
18
49
(61)*
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=431)
6
12
20
25
24
(13)
"Post-Bourgeois" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=908)
8%
2
6
4
5
1
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=626)
18
6
17
10
9
4
"Post-Bourgeois" value
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=995)
23%
11
9
8
7
4
Middle
S.E.S.
(N = 331)
25
7
15
7
13
(9)
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=512)
31
23
17
24
8
5
preferences
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=240)
40
37
23
19
(5)
(0)
"Post-Bourgeois" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N=486)
14%
4
11
10
3
3
Middle
S.E.S.
(N=353)
20
12
16
19
18
0
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=181)
35
30
36
9
18
(0)
"Post-Bourgeois" value preferences
Lower
S.E.S.
(N = 551)
0%
11
8
5
10
7
Middle
S.E.S.
(N = 526)
28
15
16
25
6
(0)
Upper-Mid. &
Upper S.E.S.
(N=431)
50
28
28
25
19
(13)
' Percentages based on fewer than 30 cases are enclosed in parentheses.
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Table 8. Value Choices by Age Cohort, Controlling for Education
(Percentage choosing acquisitive or post-bourgeois pairs)
Britain
Spread, from
Germany
Spread:
France
Spread:
Italy
Spread:
Belgium
Spread:
Netherlands
Spread:
Age in 1970
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 +
youngest to oldest cohort:
Acq.
26%
27
28
40
42
50
+24
25%
36
49
50
63
59
+34
30%
39
46
45
52
49
+19
23%
33
37
38
44
53
+30
26%
41
29
33
43
43
+ 17
35%
35
41
32
42
42
+ 7
Primary
P-B
12
9
6
5
6
4
- 8
15
12
6
7
4
2
- 1 3
; ii
2
8
4
5
1
- 1 0
23
9
10
7
7
4
- 1 9
19
3
9
8
4
3
- 1 6
0
10
7
8
7
6
+ 6
N
(121)
(216)
(205)
(299)
(267)
(315)
(235)
(353)
(330)
(278)
(278)
(213)
( 84)
(145)
(170)
(188)
(184)
(249)
(199)
(183)
(326)
(264)
(278)
(168)
( 27)
( 63)
( 98)
( 89)
(126)
(179)
(40)
(100)
(122)
(113)
( 82)
( 81)
Secondary
Acq.
25%
34
33
30
40
48
+23
11%
28
29
31
35
44
+33
21%
40
27
32
41
55
+34
18%
29
28
43
17
60
+42
19%
31
30
28
23
52
+ 33
16%
19
27
23
35
52
+ 36
P-B
16
5
12
6
9
4
- 1 2
36
31
21
3
7
0
- 3 6
17
9
14
17
8
3
- 1 4
25
21
17
14
17
20
- 5
23
14
21
21
15
0
- 2 3
36
19
21
24
13
0
- 3 6
N
(73)
(89)
(57)
(67)
(45)
(23)
(47)
(36)
(28)
(29)
(29)
(27)
(224)
(172)
(139)
(112)
( 74)
( 88)
(44)
(24)
(18)
(14)
(12)
( 5)
(147)
(117)
(106)
( 80)
( 60)
( 29)
(258)
(173)
(146)
( 79)
(48)
( 21)
University
Acq.
21%
21
38
18
33
31
+10
7%
18
17
18
25
20
+ 13
6%
6
22
15
35
35
+29
7%
14
24
15
20
75
+67
14%
32
17
8
50
40
+26
0%
10
19
11
13
33
+33
P-B
19
21
13
0
22
23
+ 4
61
47
33
27
25
20
- 4 1
48
48
39
39
10
5
- 4 3
39
40
24
15
0
0
- 3 9
41
36
50
0
20
0
-41
58
52
48
56
25
17
-41
N
(48)
(19)
( 8)
(11)
( 9)
(13)
(28)
(17)
( 6)
(11)
( 8 )
( 5)
(52)
(50)
(36)
(13)
(20)
(20)
(87)
(35)
(41)
(20)
(15)
( 8 )
(44)
(25)
(24)
(12)
(10)
(10)
(19)
(21)
(21)
( 9 )
( 9 )
( 6 )
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tiple classification analyses19 indicate that edu-
cation is among the strongest predictors of
value priorities. It ranks with occupation, reli-
gion, income levels, and age cohort as an im-
portant influence on basic values (although all
four of the latter variables also seem to have
substantial independent effects on value priori-
ties, when we control for the effects of each of
the other variables). Our own interpretation
would emphasize that this is the case because
education is our most accurate indicator of pa-
rental affluence during the respondent's forma-
tive years. It might very plausibly be argued,
however, that this relatively strong relationship
exists because of something based on education
itself: for example, that under present circum-
stances, the process of formal education assimi-
lates the individual into an elite political culture
which stresses expressive values.20 Indeed, we
suspect that there may be some truth in the lat-
ter interpretation; but we regard it as a comple-
mentary rather than an alternative explanation.
Our data do not contain a direct measure of
economic security during one's formative years,
so we cannot separate the two effects. But re-
gardless of whether we regard the impact of ed-
ucation as being largely due to education per
se, or a reflection of parental affluence, two im-
portant facts seem fairly clear: (1) the age-co-
hort differences are not due to educational dif-
ferences alone—even the less educated mem-
bers of the younger cohorts show a marked ten-
dency to be less acquisitive and more post-
bourgeois than the older cohorts (which may
reflect the fact that in the postwar era, even
the less educated have known relative afflu-
ence) . (2) Even if the socioeconomic class dif-
ferences are largely due to education per se
rather than to affluence during formative years,
we would expect them to persist over time: rel-
atively high levels of formal education are a
stable characteristic of the younger cohorts,
which is not likely to disappear as the individu-
als age. In either case, we may be justified,
therefore, in projecting changes over time as
the younger (and more educated) cohorts re-
10
 This analysis is similar to a multiple regression an-
alysis, using dummy variables. For an explanation of
the technique, see John A. Sonquist, Multivariate
Model Building: the Validation of a Search Strategy
(Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1970).
20
 Granting that this is the process at work, we must
ask why this elite political culture gives relatively
high priority to expressive values; one is tempted to
draw on relative economic security to supply at least
part of the answer. As is pointed out later in this
section, however, higher education does not seem to
be inherently linked with a libertarian political po-
sition; at other points in history, it has been associated
with relatively authoritarian and conservative positions.
Table 9. Percentage Choosing "Freedom of Speech"
by Age Group: Germany, 1962*
Age in 1962
16-25
25-30
30-50
50-65
65+
58%\not included in 1949 sample
52 /
50
40
34
* Source: EMNID Pressedienst (Gallup-Institut,
Bielefeld), cited in Encounter, Vol. 22, No. 4 (April,
1964), p. 53. Age groupings are those given in this
source.
place the older groups in the adult electorate.
Ultimately, of course, our thesis can be
proved or disproved only with the aid of longi-
tudinal data—and, as we noted earlier, very lit-
tle is available at present. A small body of rele-
vant time-series data is available, however, and
it seems worth examining. The EMNID insti-
tute of West Germany employed an item con-
cerning value priorities in a series of surveys of
German public opinion from 1949 through
1963; the question was, "Which of the Four
Freedoms do you personally consider most im-
portant?" Like the items used to measure value
priorities in our own survey, this was a forced-
choice question, requiring the individual to
make a selection among positively valued
items, according to his personal priorities. And
because the two leading choices by far were
"Freedom from Want" and "Freedom of
Speech," the choice an individual made proba-
bly tends to tap the dimension central to this
inquiry—acquisitive versus post-bourgeois val-
ues. In 1962, for example, nearly half of the
German sample ranked "Freedom of Speech"
as the most important freedom. Let us look in
Table 9 at the relationship between age and
preference for that value in 1962 (unfortu-
nately, the only year for which an age break-
down is available).
The pattern of age differences shown in Ta-
ble 9 is similar to what we found in our own
data: the young are much more likely to place
a high priority on free speech than are the old.
Prima facie, this age-relationship could be in-
terpreted as reflecting either a life-cycle effect
or intergenerational change.21
"Other possibilities also exist:
(1) It could be due to sampling error. We believe
the latter possibility can be excluded, however: we
have found a similar age-group pattern in all seven of
the European surveys cited thus far; moreover, we
have examined responses to items from a large number
of American surveys which, implicitly or openly, ask
the individual to choose between political liberties and
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The former interpretation has a certain ap-
peal: it is linked with the seemingly parsimoni-
ous assumption that nothing is really changing
—young people will be like their parents when
they get older. When examined a little more
closely, it becomes apparent that the life-cycle
interpretation is in no sense more parsimonious
than the generational interpretation; indeed, it
could be considered less so: though it assumes
that the preferences of a nation as a whole will
show no change, this result can be obtained
only if each of the age-groups within the nation
does change. Furthermore, it assumes—often
without even considering the alternative—that
the direction of any shift in preferences can be
taken for granted: they must move in the direc-
tion which tends to erase the age-group differ-
ences. We agree it would be unrealistic to as-
sume that individuals' value priorities will show
no change over their adult lives—but it is con-
ceivable that, as they age, they might move in
the direction of giving a higher priority to liber-
tarian values (for example), rather than a
lower priority. Fortunately, we are able to ex-
amine trends in the percentages giving top pri-
ority to the item cited in Table 9. The EMNID
institute's responses to the "Four Freedoms"
item over the period 1949-1963 are reported
in Table 10. The changes over time are impres-
sive in size. These shifts might be attributed to
two types of causes: 1) The mechanics of in-
tergenerational change. This process has two
aspects: (a) the recruitment of new (younger)
members into the sampling universe from 1949
to 1963; and (b) mortality among members of
the 1949 sample—most of the group aged 65+
in that year would have died off (its youngest
members would be 79 in 1963). 2) Adult atti-
tude change. The life-cycle effect constitutes a
threats to order or national security. A similar age-
group pattern occurs in virtually all of them. See, for
example, Hazel Gaudet, "The Polls: Freedom of
Speech," Public Opinion Quarterly, 34 (Fall, 1970).
The same pattern occurs in responses to comparable
items in the S.R.C. 1968 presidential election survey.
The likelihood of finding such a pattern in so many
surveys from post-industrial societies as a result of sam-
pling error appears negligible.
(2) The age-group pattern might be due to differ-
ential birth rates or life-expectancies among social
groups having distinctive value priorities. These would
tend to give the group having the higher birth rate (or
shorter life expectancy) a disproportionately strong
representation among the younger cohorts. Empiric-
ally, lower income groups tend to have had higher
birth rates and shorter life expectancies than upper
income groups over recent decades (For example, see
Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 265-270). But lower
income groups are relatively likely to express ac-
quisitive value priorities. Despite this fact, post-
bourgeois values are relatively widespread among the
younger cohorts!
Table 10. Changing Value Priorities:
Germany, 1949-1963
"Which of the Four Freedoms do you
personally consider most important?"
(Percentage choosing given item)*
Freedom from Want
Freedom of Speech
Freedom from Fear
Freedom of Worship
N.A., D.K.
1949
35%
26
17
12
10
1954
35
32
17
16
1958
28
44
10
16
2
1962
17
47
8
13
15
1963
15
56
10
14
5
* Source: EMNID Pressedienst, cited in Table 9.
special case of adult attitude change, which as-
sumes (in this case) that individuals will be-
come less libertarian and more economically-
motivated as they grow older.
The data from Tables 9 and 10 enable us to
estimate parameters for the two processes.
While rough calculations indicate that only
about one-third of the observed shift in value
priorities from 1949 to 1962 might be attrib-
uted to the recruitment/ mortality process, the
direction of the remaining adult attitude change
runs directly counter to that predicted by the
life-cycle interpretation. It seems clear that, in-
sofar as a shift in priorities occurred among in-
dividuals who were in the sampling universe in
both 1949 and 1962, they tended to move in
the "post-bourgeois" direction as they aged—
not the reverse.
The time-series data reported in Table 10,
moreover, has an excellent fit with recent Ger-
man economic history. In the Germany of
1949, "Freedom from Want" was by far the
leading choice. Germany's recovery from the
devastation of World War II had just begun to
get under way, and economic needs were ex-
tremely pressing for most of the population.
Even under conditions of poverty, however,
freedom of speech was the second-ranking
choice. The fourteen years that followed were
the years of the Wirtschaftswunder. Germany
rose from poverty to plenty with almost incred-
ible speed, and the two leading choices ex-
changed places: the percentage choosing "Free-
dom of Speech" more than doubled, while the
percentage choosing "Freedom from Want" fell
to less than half its former level (choice of the
other two alternatives remaining relatively con-
stant). These data suggest that a society may,
indeed, show a shift in value priorities in re-
sponse to changing conditions of scarcity. Ad-
mittedly, this must be regarded as an excep-
tional case: only rarely does so great a change
in the average individual's economic situation
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Table 11. The University Crisis: Value Climates in Student Milieu v. Administrative Milieu
(Percentage choosing the respective "pure" value pairs within the 16-24 year-old
cohort ["students"] and the 45-54 year-old cohort ["administrators"] of the
upper-middle/upper S.E.S. category)
Students' Milieu
Administrators' Milieu
Britain
Acq. P-B
19 16
25 4
Germany
Acq.
10
33
P-B
49
14
France
Acq.
17%
32
P-B
31
24
Italy
Acq. P-B
9 40
24 19
Belgium
Acq.
12
20
P-B
35
9
Netherlands
Acq.
6%
25
P-B
50
25
occur within so short a space of time. But the
direction of movement clearly conforms to the
expectations generated by our hypotheses.
Some fragmentary but interesting time-series
evidence from the other side of the Atlantic
might be drawn from two excellent studies of
the political consciousness of Yale students.
Each seems to be the result of penetrating ob-
servation: Robert Lane's Political Thinking and
Consciousness;22 and Kenneth Keniston's
Young Radicals.23 The former study is based
on material gathered in the 1950's and early
1960's; the latter study is based on observations
made about ten years later. Being drawn from
the same milieu with a decade's time-lag, they
provide an impressionistic sort of time-series
data. And the picture which emerges is one of
profound change. Again and again in Lane's
material one is made aware of the pressures to-
ward conformity with a conservative norm: to
be socially acceptable in the Yale of the late
50's, one felt obliged to identify with the Re-
publican Party and to support the policies of
the Establishment. The situation a decade later
shows a fascinating contrast. As Keniston
makes clear, the "Young Radicals" who had
then become a salient part of the Yale scene
were not acting out of youthful rebellion: they
were advocating policies which seemed to them
a more faithful implementation of the values
that had been inculcated in their homes. Yet
their views sharply conflicted with the social
and foreign policies of the popularly elected
governments, whether Democratic or Republi-
can. In another book which was shaped by ob-
servation of Yale students, Charles Reich gives
an insightful interpretation of this complex pro-
cess of change.24 His analysis, in part, is similar
to our own: a younger generation has emerged
which has a basically different perspective from
earlier generations (Reich refers to the younger
generation's value system as "Consciousness
** (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969).
23
 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).
"The Greening of America (New York: Random
House, 1970).
III"). My conclusions diverge from those of
Reich chiefly in the extent to which I would
generalize these changes. The present data sug-
gest that although post-industrial societies may
indeed be undergoing a transformation similar
to the emergence of "Consciousness III," the
process of transformation is decidedly uneven,
and the earlier types of consciousness continue
to be predominant even among youth—except
in certain sectors: above all, the universities.
A life-cycle interpretation tends to write off
such evidence of intergenerational differences
as due to youthful rebelliousness or high spirits,
often without considering the type of values
motivating radical youth. Although I am not
aware of a body of micro-analytic data from
Europe comparable to the Yale studies just
cited, observation of political activity on a
gross level suggests a significant change in the
values espoused by European student activists
during the past generation or so. One need
scarcely dwell on the Rightist and authoritarian
aspects of student movements in Germany and
Italy of the 1930's. What is perhaps less widely
recognized is that the predominant thrust of
political activism among French students in the
1930's also had a markedly conservative char-
acter: their most critical intervention in French
politics undoubtedly took place in early 1934,
when Monarchist and quasi-Fascist youth
(mostly upper middle-class, and many of them
from the universities) played a prominent role
in a series of riots which very nearly overthrew
the Third Republic.25 Then, as now, British stu-
dents seem to have been a deviant case: rela-
tively liberal in the 1930's and relatively con-
servative in 1970.
The wave of intense student political activity
which swept both Europe and North America
in the late 1960's seems to have diminished to-
day.20 Was it a campus fad or does it represent
23
 See, for example, William L. Shirer, The Collapse
of the Third Republic (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1969), pp. 201-223.
"Among the reasons for this decline in activity,
the fact that some concessions were made to some of
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a manifestation of broader changes in post-in-
dustrial society? I believe that the present data
and analytic framework provide a useful per-
spective from which to interpret its implica-
tions.
To illustrate, let us look at Table 11 (which
is simply a subset of Table 7). University stu-
dents in these countries tend to be drawn over-
whelmingly from the upper and upper-middle
socioeconomic strata. If we take the youngest
cohort of these strata as roughly indicative of
the value climate in the student milieu in each
country—and if we regard the 45-54 year-old
cohort of the same socioeconomic category as
indicative of the milieu from which the univer-
sity administrators are drawn—we can form an
idea of the contrasting value climates within
the two milieux.27 Our data suggest that there
have always been a certain number of people
with the value priorities which we call post-
bourgeois, but that until recently they were a
relatively small minority. Within the last de-
cade they seem to have become relatively nu-
merous—constituting a major political bloc in
themselves; furthermore, they tend to be
brought together as a group capable of setting
the prevailing tone in an important institutional
context—the universities. As Table 11 indi-
cates, post-bourgeois types now seem to hold a
heavy plurality over the traditionally predomi-
the student demands is probably the most obvious
factor, but I suspect that its importance is overrated.
Another reason is that major political confrontations
along the acquisitive/post-bourgeois dimension are
likely to be counterproductive for the latter group un-
der current conditions: the acquisitives still seem to
hold a heavy numerical predominance—as became in-
creasingly apparent on both sides of the Atlantic by the
end of the 1960's. Still another factor seems pertinent
in America: the economic recession of 1970 may have
drawn greater attention to economic considerations on
the part of groups which had previously given them
little notice. The conventional wisdom holds that eco-
nomic troubles tend to help the traditional Left;
paradoxically (but in keeping with our analysis of
intergenerational change) we would expect them to
tend to undermine the New Left.
27
 Except among the youngest cohort, we do not have
a large enough number of university-educated re-
spondents to permit reliable estimates of the responses
of those who actually have university educations.
Within the youngest cohort, we do have at least 30
student respondents from four of our six countries;
they tend to be somewhat more post-bourgeois than
other members of their age group and socioeconomic
stratum, but only moderately so: they are, on the
average, four percentage points less acquisitive and
seven points more post-bourgeois than their peers in
Table 11. This suggests that it is not principally the
university milieu which accounts for their value pri-
orities (although this seems to play a part) but the
fact that the students are from the youngest and most
affluent social categories.
nant acquisitive types in the student milieu of
five of our six national samples. While they
may not yet constitute an absolute majority
even in this setting, their preponderance over
the acquisitive types may enable the post-bour-
geois group to act as the leading influence on
many of their "ambivalent" peers. By contrast
with the student milieu, the value climate from
which the administrators are drawn tends to
contain a plurality of acquisitive over post-
bourgeois types. The administrators, moreover,
are subject to relatively strong pressures from
society as a whole—which tends to be far more
conservative in its value priorities than are the
administrators themselves. The result (rather
frequently) is not simply disagreement, but
conflicts which seem unamenable to compro-
mise—because they are based on fundamen-
tally different value priorities. (An incidental
outcome seems to be the frequent rotation of
university administrators.)
A notable exception to the foregoing pattern
appears in the British sample, where there still
seems to be a narrow plurality choosing acquis-
itive value priorities, even within the student
milieu—a finding which may go far to explain
the relative tranquility of the university scene
in that country. While there have been a few
relatively subdued uprisings at British universi-
ties in recent years, one can point to student
explosions which dwarf them in every one of
the five other countries.
According to our data, West Germany seems
to be the country which has the greatest degree
of intergenerational strain in her universities,
with a 3:1 predominance of acquisitive values
in the "administrative" milieu and a 5:1 pre-
dominance of post-bourgeois value choices in
the "student" milieu. This may seem momenta-
rily surprising, since France is clearly the coun-
try in which the most resounding student upris-
ing to date has taken place. To be sure, our
data indicate considerable intergenerational
strain in France, as well, but it seems to be less
extreme than in the German case. These facts
serve to remind us that survey data cannot be
interpreted without reference to the institu-
tional and geographical context from which
they are drawn. We would attribute the differ-
ing outcomes to structural factors: important
manifestations of student discontent took place
at a number of locations in Germany well be-
fore they occurred in France. But the high de-
gree of educational and administrative central-
ization in France meant that when an explosion
did take place in Paris, it was a crisis that en-
gulfed the whole country.
The hypothesis of intergenerational change
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 1009
in value priorities (based on different levels of
economic scarcity during a cohort's formative
years) seems to have a good fit with a wide va-
riety of evidence: with the attitudinal patterns
of the respective age cohorts, and with those of
given socioeconomic strata in samples from six
nations; with the economic history of given na-
tions and with cross-national differences in eco-
nomic experience; and with what time-series
data are available. It would be foolish to deny
that individuals can and do change during their
adult years. But if one's malleability is rela-
tively great during preadult years and tends to
decline thereafter, we would expect to find resi-
dues from formative experiences in the re-
sponse patterns of the various adult cohorts.28
Weighing the evidence as a whole, it seems to
me that our data do give a rather strong sugges-
tion of intergenerational change.
Value Priorities and Political Partisanship
The patterns of value preferences outlined
above may represent a potential force for long-
term political change. They might encourage
the development of new political parties, rela-
tively responsive to emerging value cleavages.
Or they might lead to a realignment of the so-
cial bases of existing political parties, making
age an increasingly important basis of cleavage
(during a transitional period) and eventually,
perhaps, tending to reverse the traditional
alignment of the working class with the Left,
and the middle class with the Right. For, in
terms of the value priorities discussed in this
article, upper status respondents are far likelier
than lower status respondents to support a set
of post-bourgeois principles which seem more
28
 In their analysis of British panel survey data
gathered in 1963, 1964 and 1965, Butler and Stokes,
op. cit., pp. 58-59, comment:
A theory of political 'senescence' as it is some-
times called, fits comfortably the more general be-
lief that the attitudes of youth are naturally liberal
or radical, while those of age are conservative. . . .
In the 1960's Conservative strength tended to be
weakest among those born in the 1920's and just
before. Electors younger than this tended actually
to be a little more Conservative than those who lay
within the precincts of early middle age. This ir-
regularity, although an embarrassment to any simple
theory of conservatism increasing with age, can
readily be reconciled with the concept that the con-
servation of established political tendencies is what
increases with age . . . we must ask not how old
the elector is but when it was that he was young.
For an excellent example of age-cohort analysis based
on data at the elite level, see Robert D. Putnam,
"Studying Elite Political Culture: the Case of 'Ideol-
ogy,' " American Political Science Review, 65 (Sep-
tember, 1971). Putnam finds evidence of significant
intergenerational changes in basic political style among
British and Italian politicians.
compatible with parties of movement than with
parties of order. Do we find any relationship
between political party choice and our indica-
tors of underlying value preferences? The re-
spondents in each of our samples were asked:
"If there were a General Election tomorrow, for
which party would you be most likely to vote?"
Responses to this question are cross-tabulated
with the two "pure" value pairs in Table 12;
the parties are ordered according to the con-
ventional notion of a Left-Right continuum.
In the British sample, the differences we find
are of moderate size, but they are in the ex-
pected direction: respondents choosing post-
bourgeois values are more likely to support the
Labour Party than are acquisitive-type respon-
dents; the intergroup differences amounts to
eight percentage points. The post-bourgeois
group is also relatively likely to support the
Liberal Party, and the relative gains for both
other parties come at the expense of the Con-
servatives—who are supported by a solid ma-
jority of the acquisitives, but by a minority of
the post-bourgeois group. A somewhat similar
pattern appears in the Belgian data.
In all four of the other countries we find
quite sizeable differences in the partisan prefer-
ences of the two groups, and the differences are
consistently in the expected direction: within
the Dutch sample, for example, post-bourgeois
respondents are more likely to support the par-
ties of the Left by a margin of 23 percentage
points; they give heavier support to the parties
traditionally considered to be of the Left by a
spread of 26 points in Italy; and by a spread of
15 points in Germany (22 points if we view to-
day's F.D.P. as a party of the Left, which in
some respects seems to be the case).
In France, the differences are the most im-
pressive of all: post-bourgeois respondents are
more likely to support parties usually consid-
ered Leftist by a margin of 36 percentage
points over the acquisitives. A solid majority
(56 per cent) of the latter group supports the
Gaullist U.D.R. and their allies, the R.I.; while,
by contrast, a bare 16 per cent of the post-
bourgeois group supports the Gaullist coalition!
Although it enjoys a wide plurality in the na-
tion as a whole, the Gaullist coalition draws an
almost insignificant minority of support from
the group holding post-bourgeois value priori-
ties. This finding tends to confirm our interpre-
tation of the May Revolt mentioned earlier—
that France's crisis of 1968 brought about a
partial repolarization of the electorate accord-
ing to underlying value preferences (with many
working-class respondents shifting to the Gaul-
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Table 12. Political Party Choice by Value Preferences
(Percentage choosing given political party)
Value Pref:
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
Labour
37%
45
+ 8
Left
34%
70
+36
Socialist
31%
38
+ 7
Britain
Liberal Conserv.
7 57
9 46
+ 2 -11
France
UDR,
Center RI
10 56
15 16
+ 5 -40
Belgium
Liberal Christian
(PLP) Social
13 56
26 37
+13 -19
N
(570)
(126)
N
(533)
(170)
N
(253)
(117)
SPD
48%
63
+15
Left
28%
54
+26
Socialist,
Dem. '66
46%
69
+23
FDP
5
12
+ 7
DC,
PRI
56
38
- 1 8
Germany
CDU/CSU
46
23
- 23
Italy
Liberal
8
8
NPD
2
4.
Extreme
Right
9
1
- 8
Netherlands
Liberal
12
14
+ 2
Confes-
sional
43
17
- 26
N
(648)
(164)
N
(398)
(168)
N
(315)
(216)
list side, while post-bourgeois elements from
the middle class shifted to the Left). This sud-
den shift in vote from 1967 to 1968 does not
seem to have been simply a temporary reaction
to the 1968 crisis, with the voters returning to
their normal partisan allegiance after the emer-
gency had faded away. On the contrary, the
French electorate still seems to retain an un-
equalled degree of political polarization accord-
ing to value preferences in 1970, nearly two
years after the May Revolt. This interpretation
tends to be supported by data from a panel sur-
vey reported elsewhere.29 The apparently en-
during nature of this redistribution of political
positions, once it has taken place, suggests that
it may, indeed, correspond to relatively deep-
seated values. In this connection, it seems sig-
nificant that the other two countries in our sur-
vey which have experienced the most massive
New Left upheavals (Germany and Italy) also
show relatively high degrees of polarization ac-
a
 Philip Converse and Roy Pierce noted a sizeable
shift to the Right from 1967 to 1968, within a panel
of respondents asked to rank themselves on a Left-
Right continuum in both years. After re-interviewing
these respondent a third time, they report that more
than 99 per cent of the change from 1967 to 1968 was
preserved in 1969. See Converse and Pierce, "Basic
Cleavages in French Politics and the Disorders of
May and June, 1968," paper presented at the 7th
World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, Sep-
tember, 1970.
cording to value priorities, although its magni-
tude remains smaller than what we find in
France. By contrast, Great Britain (apart from
ethnic conflicts in Northern Ireland) has prob-
ably had the greatest measure of domestic tran-
quility among these countries in recent years—
and shows a relatively weak relationship be-
tween value priorities and political party
choice.
Admittedly, we have not mapped out in
any precise fashion the differences between
the political goals of the acquisitive and
post-bourgeois groups: the latter group may
still be in the process of defining a program.
Moreover, there is at least an equal lack of
precision in the party labels which we have
just employed: we regard "Left" and
"Right" as merely convenient shorthand
terms under which to group (for cross-na-
tional comparisons) two sets of parties
which tend to differ in being relatively con-
servative or relatively change-oriented, but
which otherwise vary a good deal from
country to country. To be sure, the acquisi-
tive and post-bourgeois types of respondents
do seem to react quite differently to these
two sets of parties, and the pattern is fairly
consistent cross-nationally. But the cleavage
is not one which runs neatly along the tradi-
tional Left-Right dimension. Perhaps for this
reason political polarization according to un-
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 1011
derlying value preferences seems much more
pronounced in relation to what might be
called New Left parties (in countries where
they exist) than in relation to what might be
called the Traditional Left. To illustrate, let
us take a closer look at the vote for certain
small parties which seem to have a distinc-
tive appeal for the post-bourgeois constitu-
ency (see Table 13).
In the French case, the PSU emerged
from the crisis of May and June, 1968, as the
political embodiment of the New Left, the
only significant party which had unambigu-
ously endorsed the May Revolt. Although it
polled only 4 per cent of the vote nationally,
and is supported by only 2 per cent of the
acquisitives in our sample, it draws far more
than this share of support among the post-
bourgeois constituency—getting fully 29 per
cent of this group's preferences. By
comparison, the other parties of the French
Left enjoy only a relatively small advantage
among the post-bourgeois group—getting 9
percentage points more support there than
among the acquisitive constituency. A simi-
lar pattern applies to support for two other
parties which might be said to have a more
or less New Left coloring: Demokraten '66 in
The Netherlands and the P.S.I.U.P. in Italy.
The post-bourgeois group shows a marked
preference for these parties, over the other
parties conventionally regarded as of the
Left.80
M In the Italian case, however, the Communist party
also seems to enjoy a relative preference within the
post-bourgeois constituency: the PCI and PSIUP
combined are supported by seven per cent of the
acquisitives and by 30 per cent of the post-bourgeois
group (leaving the two Socialist parties only a slightly
greater proportion of support from the post-bourgeois
group than from the acquisitives). It appears, then,
When we turn to the Belgian case, we find a
rather surprising phenomenon. In traditional
terms, we probably would not view the Belgian
separatist parties as characteristically of the
Left at all. But in their basis of recruitment,
these parties (both Flemish and Walloon, but
predominately the former) play a role compa-
rable to that played by the PSU in France:
they draw their strength very disproportion-
ately from the post-bourgeois types, rather than
from the acquisitives. In France, the ratio is
nearly 15:1; in Belgium there is nearly a 4:1
over-representation of post-bourgeois as com-
pared with acquisitive types. Indeed, when we
include the separatist parties in our analysis,
the Belgian Socialists actually show a slight def-
icit among the post-bourgeois group, when
compared with the acquisitives (in Table 13).
The "New Left" parties and the Belgian sep-
aratists might seem to have little in common,
other than a radical opposition to fundamental
aspects of the established social system. But this
disparity of political goals, juxtaposed with an
apparent similarity in social bases and underly-
ing value preferences, leads us back to a sug-
gestion about the nature of post-bourgeois poli-
tics which was mentioned earlier: an important
latent function may be to satisfy the need for
belongingness. According to Maslow, this need
comes next on the individual-level hierarchy,
after needs related to sustenance and safety
have been fulfilled. I would acknowledge and
emphasize the importance of the manifest goals
of a given movement in a given context; but it
that members of our Italian sample react to the PCI
almost as if it were a New Left party—an interesting
finding, in view of the fact that support for the French
Communist party does not show a similar pattern;
one wonders if the PCF cut itself off from post-
bourgeois support in repudiating the May Revolt.
Table 13. Political Party Choice by Value Preferences: Effect of the New-
Left and Belgian Separatist Parties
(Percentage choosing given political party)
Value -
Pref:
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
Value Pre
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
PSU
2%
29
+27
f.
Other
Left
32
41
+ 9
Dem. '66
13%
38
+25
France
Center
10
15
+ 5
UDR,
RI
56
16
-40
Netherlands
Socialist
32
31
- 1
Lib.
11
14
+ 3
N
(533)
(170)
Confes-
sional
43
17
- 2 6
PSIUP
1%
7
+6
N
(315)
(216)
Other
Left
26
47
+21
Sep.
aratist
10%
36
+26
Italy
DC, PRI Liberal
56
38
-18
Socialist
28
24
- 4
8
8
Belgium
Liberal
12
16
+ 4
Extreme
Right
9
1
- 8
Christian
Social
50
23
- 2 7
N
(39S)
(168)
N
(271)
(128)
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also seems likely that protest movements which
are in radical conflict with their environment
provide their members with a sense of belong-
ingness. In the midst of large, anonymous, bu-
reaucratically-organized societies, these move-
ments may become tight little communities
which are bound together all the more closely
because they have a sense of radical opposition
to, and isolation from, the surrounding society.
Insofar as the drive for belongingness is an im-
portant component of these movements, their
ideological content can be quite flexible. If we
view the underlying dimension as based in part
on this motivation, there is common ground be-
tween the Belgian Separatists and the New Left
groups.
The similarity goes beyond this. The Flemish
separatists clearly are not seeking economic
gains. Indeed, they seem prepared to sacrifice
them for what they regard as cultural and hu-
manitarian gains. In this respect also, they
might be grouped with the New Left. After the
need for belongingness, the next priorities (ac-
cording to Maslow) are for self-esteem and
self-actualization, and for fulfillment of one's
intellectual and esthetic potential. In a some-
what chaotic way, most of these (postacquisi-
tive) values seem to be reflected in the issues
espoused by the New Left: the movement re-
flects a broad shift in emphasis from economic
issues to life-style issues.31
"This ordering of priorities is, of course, not new
in itself. Weber and Veblen, among others, called
attention to the disdain for economic striving and an
emphasis on distinctive life styles among economically
secure strata throughout history. Veblen interprets the
anti-acquisitive life style of past leisure classes as an
attempt to protect their superior status by excluding
individuals rising from lower economic levels. See
Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class
(New York: Modern Library, 1934). It is highly
dubious whether this interpretation applies to the
contemporary post-bourgeois group as a whole. Its
members appear universalistic in outlook and some-
times seem to imitate the life-style of lower strata.
Conspicuous consumption seems to play a relatively
small role in their behavior—unless we interpret going
barefoot as a devious variation on conspicuous con-
sumption. We would view needs for intellectual and
esthetic self-realization as political motivations in them-
selves. Concern for pollution of the environment and
the despoiling of its natural beauty—issues which
played a minor political role until quite recently—
have suddenly become prominent, with the emergence
into political relevance of the current youth cohorts.
These concerns may be justified in terms of self-
preservation ("We are about to suffocate beneath an
avalanche of garbage") but this argument may be
somewhat hyperbolic: I suspect that behind this new
wave of protest, there may be a heightened sensitivity
to the esthetic defects of industrial society. It seems
clear that other factors are also involved in the emerg-
ence of a New Left: situational factors unique to a
given movement in a given society. I will not attempt
to deal with them in this cross-national analysis.
We find a quite interesting relationship be-
tween value priorities and political party choice
in our data. I have spoken of this phenomenon
as reflecting a tendency toward reordering po-
litical party choices to bring them into har-
mony with underlying values. But this line of
reasoning assumes a causal relationship, in
which the value preference is an independent
variable capable of influencing current party
choice. To what extent is this assumption justi-
fied? It could be argued that the association be-
tween value priorities and party choice is spuri-
ous—that it results from the fact that given in-
dividuals have been raised in relatively conser-
vative (or relatively Left-oriented) back-
grounds, shaping them in a way which accounts
for the presence of both the value preferences
and the political party choice currently ex-
pressed.
It is difficult to provide a conclusive demon-
stration of what caused what, but we can sub-
ject the foregoing interpretation to an interest-
ing test. Our respondents were asked a series of
questions to ascertain what had been their par-
ents' political party preference or (failing this)
their general Left-Right tendance. Let us exam-
ine the relationship between value priorities
and current party choice, controlling for the
political background in which the respondent
was raised (see Table 14). A comparison of
the N's given for each group in Table 14 indi-
cates that there is, indeed, some tendency for
the children of Left-affiliated parents to show a
relative preference for post-bourgeois values;
the strength of this tendency varies considera-
bly from country to country. But for present
purposes, the crucial finding which emerges
from Table 14 is that, even when we control
for this source of variation, quite substantial
differences persist between the political party
preferences of acquisitive-oriented respondents
and those of post-bourgeois respondents. In
many cases, these differences become even
larger than they were in Table 12. Table 14
shows the flow of voters from the party in
which they were raised, to other parties—and
the flow certainly does seem to be influenced by
the value priorities of the individual. In the
British sample, evidence of intergenerational
defection from the two major parties is rela-
tively weak, and we find two mildly anomalous
cases (in which post-bourgeois respondents are
a trifle less likely to support the Labour Party
than are the acquisitive respondents). Even in
the British sample, however, the net tendency is
for Labour to be relatively strong and the Con-
servatives relatively weak among the post-bour-
geois group, holding parental background con-
stant. In our Dutch sample, among those raised
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by parents who supported one of the confes-
sional parties, 78 per cent of the group showing
acquisitive values remain faithful to those par-
ties; by contrast, among those indicating post-
bourgeois values only 44 per cent have stayed
with the church-linked parties—while an equal
number have shifted their support to the parties
of the Left (the Socialists; or Demokraten '66).
Among Dutch respondents who were raised by
supporters of the Socialist party, there seems to
be greater continuity; fully 92 per cent of the
post-bourgeois group say that they, too, would
vote for the Left; among the acquisitive-ori-
ented group, however, we find a rate of defec-
tion which is twice this high.
Quite sizeable differences appear in the Ital-
ian sample; most notably, among those raised
in a Christian Democratic or Centrist back-
ground, only 4 per cent of the acquisitive-
type respondents defect to the Left—as com-
pared with 33 per cent among the post-bour-
geois respondents. In the German sample,
somewhat similarly, post-bourgeois respondents
from Christian Democratic backgrounds show
a relatively strong tendency to defect from this
political affiliation: while 63 per cent of the
"acquisitive" respondents remain in the Chris-
tian Democratic fold, only 46 per cent of the
post-bourgeois respondents do so. The partisan
shift seems to reflect a relative drawing away
from the church-linked parties on the part of
the post-bourgeois group:32 it continues the
trend toward secularism traditionally associated
with the Left. Indeed, the post-bourgeois group
seems noticeably more sensitive to the suppos-
edly outworn religious/secular cleavage than to
the socioeconomic one: consistently, across our
samples, the Christian Democratic parties show
a heavy relative loss among this constituency,
while the Liberal parties—which emphasize
freedom of expression but often are more con-
servative on socioeconomic issues than the
Christian Democrats—show a relative gain.
The shift, indeed, seems more responsive to
life-style values than to economic ones.
The most dramatic evidence of intergenera-
tional change in political party loyalties is
found in the French sample. Among the group
raised within families which supported political
"The linkage between church and party is most ex-
plicit on the Continent, but the British Conservative
Party is no exception to this pattern: affiliation with
the Established Church of England is strongly linked
with preference for the Conservative Party. Even when
wo control for social class, the Anglicans in our
sample are more likely to favor the Conservative
Party than are members of minority faiths or non-
religious respondents, by a margin of nearly 20 per-
centage points. The more frequently one attends the
Anglican Church, moveover, the more likely one is
to support the Conservatives.
parties of the Right, those with acquisitive
value priorities are very likely to continue in
that tradition: 91 per cent support the Gaullist
coalition. There seems to be an astoundingly
high rate of defection among the post-bour-
geois group, however; 70 per cent of them indi-
cate that they would vote for one of the parties
of the Left! Conversely, among those raised in
a family which preferred the Left, there is little
defection to the Gaullist coalition. Among the
acquisitive value group, the rate of defection to
the Gaullists is nearly five times as high: a
substantial 29 per cent say that they would vote
for one of the governing parties.
A number of the cells in Table 14 contain
too few cases to be significant by themselves,33
but the overall pattern is clear: the presence of
post-bourgeois values is linked consistently with
a relative tendency to remain loyal to the Left,
among those who were brought up in that tra-
dition, and with a tendency to shift to the Left
among those who were raised in other political
climates. Jennings and Niemi have found evi-
dence that recall data (such as ours) tends to
exaggerate the degree of consistency between
political party preferences of parent and child
(perhaps as a result of the respondent's ten-
dency to reduce cognitive dissonance).34 This
finding implies that, if anything, our data prob-
ably understate the degree to which intergener-
ational party shift is taking place.
Implications of Intergenerational Change
Our conclusion, then, is that the transforma-
tion of value priorities which our data seem to
indicate does imply a change in the social basis
of political partisanship in most, if not all, of
these countries. This change may already have
been under way for some time. To illustrate: In
the first elections of the Fifth Republic, the
French electorate apparently voted along class
lines to a very considerable extent. Lipset, for
example, provides a table showing that work-
ing-class voters were 29 per cent more likely to
support the parties of the Left than were mem-
bers of the modern middle class, in 1958.3S Our
"The reduced number of cases is due to the fact
that here we are dealing only with those respondents:
1. Who have a political party preference—which
they are willing to disclose; and
2. Whose parents had a political party preference—
which was known by the respondent.
M
 See M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The
Transmission of Political Values from Parent to
Child," The American Political Science Review, 62
(March, 1968), pp. 169-184.
"Calculated from Seymour M. Lipset, op. cit.,
Chapter V, Table IV. Our comparison focuses on the
two more dynamic groups of industrial society—the
workers, on one hand, and the modern middle class
on the other hand. Although the principle is similar,
our measure of class voting, therefore, is not identical
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Table 14. Intergenerational Party Shifts: Political Party Choice by
Value Preferences, Controlling for Parents' Political Party
(Percentage choosing given party)
Value Pref •
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
Parents preferred Labour
Respondent would vote:
Lab. Lib. Cons. N
64% 5 31 (185)
72 7 21 (47)
+ 8 +2 -10
Britain
Parents preferred Liberals
Lab. Lib.
23% 17
22 34
- 1 +17
Germany
Cons. N
61 (64)
44 ( 9)
- 1 7
Parents preferred Conservatives
Lab.
12%
10
- 2
Lib.
3
13
+10
Cons.
85
77
- 8
N
(171)
(31)
Value Pref:
Parents preferred Socialists Parents preferred Liberals, FDP Parents preferred Christian Democrats
Respondent would vote:
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
Soc
87%
87
FDP
4
8
+4
Chr.
Dems.
9
6
- 3
N
(78)
(36)
Soc.
13%
40
FDP
63
60
France
Chr.
Dems.
13
0
N
(8)
(5)
Soc
35%
45
+10
FDP
2
7
+5
Chr.
Dems.
63
46
-17
N
015)
( 41)
Parents preferred "Left," Comm., Soc. Parents preferred Center, MRP Parents preferred "Right," Indep., Gaullist
Value Pref: Respondent would vote:
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
PSU
6%
25
+19
Other
Left
60
52
- 8
Center
5
8
+3
UDR.
RI
29
6
- 2 3
N
(106)
( 52)
PSU
0%
35
+35
Other
Left
8
26
+18
Center
69
39
- 3 0
Italy
UDR,
RI
23
0
- 2 3
N
(13)
(23)
PSU
0%
35
+35
Other
Left
4
35
+31
Center
5
0
- 5
UDR,
RI
91
29
- 6 2
N
(118)
( 34)
Parents preferred "Left," Com., Soc. Parents preferred "Center," Chr. Dems. Parents preferred Liberals, Extr. Right
Value Pref: Respondent would vote:
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
Left
81%
92
+11
DC,
PRI
13
5
- 8
Lib.
4
3
- 1
Extr.
Right
2
0
- 2
N
(53)
(38)
Left
4%
33
+29
DC,
PRI
92
64
- 2 8
Lib.
2
4
+2
Belgium
Extr.
Right
3
0
- 3
N
(119)
(55)
Left
33%
75
+42
DC,
PRI
7
0
- 7
Lib.
60
25
- 3 5
Extr.
Right
0
0
N
(15)
( 8)
Parents preferred Socialists Parents preferred Catholic tendance Parents preferred Liberals
Value Pref: Respondent would vote:
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
Sep.
11
+11
Soc.
83%
78
- 5
Liberal
(PLP)
10
11
+ 1
Chr.
Soc.
i 
1.
N
(40)
(18)
Sep.
9
38
+29
Soc.
10
3
- 7
Netherlands
Lib-
eral
5
11
+ 6
Chr.
Soc.
76
49
- 2 7
N
(101)
( 37)
Sep.
40
+40
Soc.
IS
- 1 8
Lib-
eral
59
60
+ 1
Chr.
Soc.
24
- 2 4
N
(17)
(10)
Parents preferred Socialists Parents preferred confessional party
(KVP, ARP. CHU)
Parents preferred Liberals
Value Pref: Respondent would vote:
KVP,
Soc, Liberal ARP.
D'66 CHU N
Soc,
D'66
Liberal
KVP,
ARP,
CHU
Soc,
D'66
KVP,
Liberal ARP,
CHU
Acquisitive
Post-Bourg.
Difference:
86%
92
+ 6 +4
11
0
-11
(57)
(73)
16%
44
+28
6
11
+ 5
79
44
-35
(102)
( 72)
23%
41
+ 18
73
59
-14 - 5
(22)
(18)
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 1015
1968 survey indicated that the percentage
spread between social classes was only about
half this size in 1967 and that it dropped sev-
eral points from 1967 to 1968. Our 1970 data
indicate little tendency for the French elector-
ate to return to the 1967 level of class voting.
Paul Abramson, moreover, has recently re-
ported evidence of a decline in the social class
basis of political partisanship in France, Ger-
many, and Italy—although not in Great Brit-
ain.36 Our own data suggest a pressure that
should tend to reduce the incidence of class
voting in Britain, but this pressure seems to be
a good deal weaker there than in the Continen-
tal countries. We would expect the extent to
which partisan repolarization actually takes
place to be limited by the relative strength of
existing political party identification in given
countries: the comparatively high degree of re-
polarization apparent in France may have been
facilitated by the relatively weak sense of politi-
cal party identification which characterized the
electorate of that country until very recently.
Conversely, the relatively small amount of re-
polarization indicated in our British sample
may reflect the presence of comparatively
strong political party loyalties in Britain. A re-
cent analysis of socialization data by Jack Den-
nis and Donald McCrone, for example, sug-
gests that feelings of identification with a politi-
cal party were less widespread and less intense in
France than in any of five other Western de-
mocracies studied (although Dennis and Mc-
Crone find evidence of an increase over time in
political party identifiers in France, a finding
which our own data support). According to
Dennis and McCrooe, the publics of Great
Britain and the U.S. apparently rank highest in
extent and intensity of political party identifica-
with that used by Robert R. Alford in Party and So-
ciety (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962). The traditional
middle class, as a stagnant or declining element in
the economy, has not shown a change comparable to
that which apparently has taken place among the
modern middle class; combining these two groups (as
Alford does) dampens the effect we are describing.
"See Paul R. Abramson, "The Changing Role of
Social Class in Western European Politics," Compara-
tive Political Studies (July, 1971). Seymour M. Lipset
and Stein Rokkan argue that "the party systems of
the 1960's reflect, with but few significant exceptions,
the cleavage structures of the 1920's"; see Lipset and
Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-
National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press,
1967), p. 50. On the other hand, Lipset reports some
data which seem to indicate a decline in class voting
among the American electorate from 1936 to 1968:
see Lipset, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Change
and Persistence in Social Structure (New York: Basic
Books, 1968), Table 8-2, pp. 274-275. A change in
degree, if not in type of cleavage, seems to be taking
place.
tion, with Germany and Italy ranking at inter-
mediate levels.37
There may be still another reason why Britain
continues to maintain the traditional class-vot-
17
 See Dennis and McCrone, "Preadult Development
of Political Party Identification in Western Democ-
racies," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2
(July, 1970), pp. 243-263. This evidence confirms
earlier findings: see Philip E. Converse and Georges
Dupeux in Campbell et ah, Elections and the Political
Order; cf. Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan
Stability," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 2, No.
2 (July, 1969), pp. 139-171. In the latter two articles,
Converse (and Dupeux) report that individuals who
knew their father's party affiliation are more likely
to identify with a party themselves than are those
whose fathers did not transmit a cue concerning party
identification. If citizens with a clear political party
identification are relatively unlikely to shift their vote
according to underlying values, Table 14 may give
a conservative estimate of the impact of value priori-
ties on party choice: the table deals exclusively wiih
those who report a definite party choice themselves
and received party preference cues from their parents.
In addition, however, Converse finds (in "Of Time and
Partisan Stability") that older cohorts tend to have
relatively strong attachments to given political parties,
as a function of the number of years they have been
eligible to vote for the political party of their choice
in free elections. This suggests the possibility that at
least part of the relationship between value preference
and party shift may be due to the greater liklihood of
older respondents having "acquisitive" values and
relatively strong party loyalties. This hypothesis might
be tested by controlling for age, in addition to the
other controls in Table 14. When we do so, the rela-
tionship between value preferences and party shift does
not seem to disappear, but the highly skewed relation-
ship between age and values reduces the number of
cases in some of the cells to the vanishing point. We
can apply another sort of test, however, based on
cross-national comparisons. Our 1968 data from
Britain, France and Germany contain information
about the strength of party identification. The pattern
varies a good deal from country to country. In the
British sample (where the present party system has
been established for nearly half a century) intense
partisan identification falls off regularly and sharply,
as we move from oldest to youngest age group. The
oldest British group contains four times as many
strong partisan identifiers as does the youngest group.
Intense partisanship falls off regularly but less steeply
in the German sample (strong identifiers occurring
twice as frequently among the oldest group as among
the youngest group). So far, this is entirely consistent
with the pattern reported by Converse. The French
data, however, fit Converse's model only if we regard
the present French party system as newly established:
partisanship decreases only very slightly in the French
sample, as we move from old to young. French teen-
agers are almost as likely to declare themselves strong
partisans as are the 60-year-olds! While at other age
levels the French are least likely of the three nationali-
ties to express a strong sense of party identification,
among this youngest group they show the highest
proportion. The relationship between intergenerational
party shift and underlying value priorities noted in our
French sample cannot readily be attributed to the
older cohorts' relatively strong attachment to existing
political parties—yet value-linked intergenerational
party shift seems to occur to a greater extent in
France than in any of the other national samples.
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1016 The American Political Science Review Vol. 65
ing pattern of industrial society: the British La-
bour Party has never been a party of the Left
in the same sense as the Marxist parties on the
Continent. From the start, it has been a party
of moderate reform, rather than one of revolu-
tion. Thus, there is less contrast between La-
bour and Conservative in Britain than between
Left and Right on the Continent; an embour-
geoisified worker can continue to feel comfort-
able in voting for the Labour Party38 while,
conversely, a post-bourgeois Englishman has
less incentive to switch from Conservative to
Labour.
For the time being (as Table 2 indicates),
the acquisitive group is much larger than
the post-bourgeois group in all of these
countries: in case anyone doubted it, the
squares outnumber the swingers. In practical
terms, this suggests that the potential reser-
voir of voters who might shift to the Right is
larger than the potential base for the New
Left. But if our cross-temporal interpretation
is correct, this situation is in a process
of rapid change. Assuming intracohort sta-
bility in value priorities,39 a projection of
changes due to recruitment and mortality based
on Table 5 suggests that the two pure groups
might reach numerical parity—on the Conti-
nent—within the next 20 years. Given the fact
that the post-bourgeois types tend to be highly
educated, they are likely to be better organized
and politically more active than the acquisitive-
oriented group. In terms of political effective-
ness, the two groups might reach parity within,
say, the next 15 years (these projections apply
to the European Community countries; Britain
appears to lag behind them by about ten
years).
The size of the partisan redistribution in
France in 1968 may give an idea of the extent
"Even relatively affluent English workers are likely
to remain staunch supporters of the Labour Party, ac-
cording to John H. Goldthorpe, David Lockwood,
Frank Beckhofer and Jennifer Platt: see The Affluent
Worker: Political Attitudes and Behavior (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1968). Richard F. Ham-
ilton argues that the same was true of French workers
during the Fourth Republic; he may be correct in re-
gard to that period, but our data indicate that the pat-
tern has changed significantly during the Fifth Re-
public. See Hamilton, Affluence and the French Work-
er in the Fourth Republic (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1967).
"At first glance, the assumption of intracohort
stability may seem unrealistic: adult change does take
place. But, for reasons indicated above, it would
probably be rash to assume that the adult cohorts
will necessarily become more acquisitive as they age.
In view of the uncertainty of the direction of possible
shifts within adult cohorts, the assumption of intra-
cohort stability may provide at least a useful first
approximation.
to which—under crisis conditions—a similar
repolarization might take place in the other
countries at the present time. But this process
can, of course, be influenced by situational fac-
tors, such as political leadership in the given
countries. The levels of support for the SPD in-
dicated in our 1970 survey suggest that Willy
Brandt, for example, has succeeded in doing
what the French Left notably failed to do in
1968—to attract the post-bourgeois group with-
out alienating the acquisitive types.
In Western Europe as a whole, the pro-
spective social base for movements of radical so-
cial change appears likely to increase sharply
during the next two decades. But in order to be
effective, movements seeking radical change
must shape their tactics with an awareness of
current realities. In view of the wide prepon-
derance which the acquisitives seem to hold
over post-bourgeois respondents in Western
electorates, a Weatherman-type strategy (for
example) not only seems likely to be counter-
productive in the short run; to the extent that it
had any real impact on the economy, it appar-
ently would tend to be self-defeating in the long
run as well.
The new Left-Right continuum resembles the
old in that it pits forces of change against
those of the status quo—but the values moti-
vating change relate to life styles rather than
acquisition, and the social bases supporting
change show a corresponding shift. For the
time being, the potential social base for the
New Left may be a distinct minority. The older
value groups are still split, however, and a New
Left could be politically effective through alli-
ances with the Old Left which emphasize eco-
nomic issues—even, to some extent, at the
price of playing down some of the expressive
issues which are most appealing to the New
Left constituency. Conversely, when partisans
of the New Left appear to threaten the basic
social order (as in France, in May, 1968), they
emphasize a cleavage which isolates them from
both factions of the acquisitive-oriented popu-
lation: they threaten to upset an apple cart
which has for twenty years provided an unprec-
edented supply of apples. The post-bourgeois
group may contend that the apples are sour.
They may be right. But the difference in opin-
ion springs from an ingrained difference in
tastes.
The present essay has, no doubt, only
scratched the surface in the analysis of inter-
generational value changes within advanced in-
dustrial societies. Further efforts are needed in
developing more accurate and more exhaustive
measurements of such changes, and in applying
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1971 The Silent Revolution in Europe 1017
these measurements to a longitudinal data base.
In this early exploration, we find a fair amount
of evidence that our indicators of value pri-
orities tap basic aspects of an individual's belief
system: a number of other attitudinal items
show relatively great constraint in relation to
these value indicators, and the response pattern
seems integrated into the social structure in a
way which suggests that these values are early-
established and relatively stable. Moreover,
cross-national differences in value choices have
a fit with the economic history of these coun-
tries, over the past two generations, which fur-
ther seems to support this interpretation. It
seems at least plausible to conclude that inter-
generational change is taking place in the value
priorities of West European populations—and
that this change may have a significant long-
term impact on their political behavior.40
40
 These findings seem to contradict some key pro-
jections in the literature which focuses on analysis of
the future. Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, for
example, contend that:
There is a basic, long-term multifold trend toward:
1. Increasingly sensate (empirical, this-worldly, sec-
ular, humanistic, pragmatic, utilitarian, contract-
ual, epicurean or hedonistic) cultures.
2. Bourgeois, bureaucratic, "meritocratic," demo-
cratic (and nationalistic) elites. . . .
My reading of the data implies that, while these trends
may have prevailed until recently, certain aspects may
be undergoing a reversal in post-industrial societies.
Specifically, I doubt that the elites of these societies
will become increasingly bourgeois, meritocratic or
nationalistic; or that these cultures are likely to become
increasingly pragmatic or utilitarian. Kahn and Wiener
make a number of additional projections which do
strike me as likely to hold true; see The Year 2000:
A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-
Three Years (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 7.
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